Coll 6/67(3) 'Boundaries of South Eastern Arabia and Qatar.' [‎358r] (722/830)

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t
to Abu Dhabi; but this point was not pursued at this meeting, although it was
alluded to from time to time, and it was not until the next meeting on the
following day that Fuad Bey developed it further. g tfte
FUAD BEY then reverted to the question of the northern terminal of the
line now proposed by His Majesty s Government, and tried to show that King
Abdul Aziz could claim not only Qasr-as-Salwa, but the hills to the north-east of
it up to a point some 10 or 15 miles up the eastern shore of the Dohat-as-Salwa.
He claimed that the frontier should run thence in an easterly direction and then
turn slightly southwards and run to the sea to the north of Khor-al-Odeid.
A long discussion followed on the question of this line As regards the
north-western end of it Mr. BENDED pointed out that the Qatar Peninsula was
a clearly defined geographical feature. It was almost an island, and it was only
reasonable that the frontier between it and its neighbours on the mainland should
follow the natural geographical division between the mainland and the peninsula
itself. It was because of this natural geographical division that His Majesty’s
Government had been prepared to concede to King Abdul Aziz the whole of the
western shore of the Dohat-as-Salwa, but this same argument applied in turn
with equal force against carrying the frontier up the eastern shore of the bay.
If this were done the same anomaly would be created as that which at present
existed on its western shore. His Majesty’s Government had in fact offered
King Abdul Aziz a most generous concession in this area, including the important
strategic point of Qasr-as -Salwa. Moreover, the Jebel Naksh and the hills in its
neighbourhood were part of the same geographical formation as the Jebel Dukhan,
which was indisputably the property of Qatar. The case, therefore, for following
the natural geographical frontier at this point appeared overwhelming.
The discussion on this portion of the line was resumed at intervals at various
stages of the conversation, and eventually FUAD BEY asked whether His
Majesty’s Government would be prepared to offer a line, which he indicated on
the map, running eastwards and south-eastwards from the eastern shore of the
Dohat-as-Salwa, and following for some distance the circumference of a circle
with a radius of some 10 or 15 miles from Qasr-as-Salwa.
Mr. RENDEL explained that he had no authority to offer any concession on
this point. He had had the greatest difficulty in securing general agreement for
so large a concession as that which had, in fact, been offered. As Fuad Bey no
doubt knew, His Majesty’s Government were, in fact, committed to the protec
tion of Qatar against any major aggression. If His Majesty’s Government were
to make any further concession to the north-east of Qasr-as-Salwa, they would
so weaken the position of Qatar strategically that they might not be able
effectively to carry out this obligation. Just as Qasr-as-Salwa might be regarded
as an important strategic outpost for Saudi Arabia, so the area to the north-east
of it was an essential strategic area from the point of view of the safety of Qatar.
Indeed, it was much more important for Qatar to retain this area than for Saudi
Arabia to hold Qasr-as-Salwa, since Qatar was a very small State with no
hinterland, whereas Saudi Arabia covered a vast area, and was therefore in a far
stronger position from the point of view of defence.
FUAD BEY at a later stage of the meeting stated, in reply to a question by
Mr. Ward, that he thought that King Abdul Aziz might be prepared to abandon
his claim to the Jebel Naksh, which he described as an outlying spur of the
Jebel Dukhan range. .
Fuad Bey then raised the question of the Saudi claim to Khor-al-udeid,
which he described as being the most vital point at issue, and to which he main
tained that King Abdul Aziz possessed an established and irrefutable right. He
explained that the Khor-al-Odeid had in the past been well known as a landing
place for merchandise for the Hasa coast, and that King Abdul Aziz could not
abandon an outlet to the sea which possessed such important possibilities of
commercial development.
SIR A. RYAN pointed out that Fuad Bey had told him at Jedda, when
describing the Saudi claims, that King Abdul Aziz wanted to secuie Khor-al-
Odeid in order to stop smuggling through it into Saudi territory, and that this
seemed rather inconsistent with the contention that it was needed foi commercial
development.
[431 bo—3] B 2