File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎101v] (211/834)

58 —
the southern section of the railway is so far reduced that, at the.
present moment, Medina no longer looks to be supplied by that
channel, and is virtually isolated. _
That is the Arab military situation on the map. in the most
important area of operations, the north, notably advanced ; on
the enemy’s line of communications, advanced, though not greatly ;
in the south, much as it was.
If looked at from another point of view, that of strength in
comparison with the enemy, the situation shows, both on paper
and in fact, somewhat more marked improvement all round. I he
Northern army has received during the period about 1,000 lecruits
for its contingent of regulars, in addition to a force biought up
from Wejh by Emir Zeid, which previously was inactive with
Abdullah. It has also been joined by Bedouin contingents from
tribes of better fighting quality than were available previously,
e.g., Huweitat (Ibn dazi) and Beni Sakhr. With these some
Turkish regular troops in considerable strength have been met in
the open and defeated more than once, notably in the recent
battle at Seil el-Hasa, where over eighty per cent of an enemy
force, above 600 strong, were accounted for.
In equipment Feisal’s army is also considerably stronger
than it was. Auxiliary services of aeroplanes and armoured
cars have been provided for it, and it is well supplied with guns
and with personnel who can use them. It is, however, still
conspicuously short of transport and, therefore, of food and means
of protection against cold. Abdullah’s army is largely drawn
from fluctuating contingents of Bedouins of inferior fighting
quality, whose spirit has been impaired by various causes—by
the winter cold (the Bedouin campaigning season is summer), by
protracted failure of supplies due to certain manoeuvres of those
responsible for transport from Yambo, by enemy propaganda,
and, most of all, by the slow payment of promised subsidies.
The last cause has particularly affected the Harb in both Abdullah’s
force and All’s. On the other hand, the Juheinah, for what they
are worth, have kept loyal, and the Ateibah contingent, though
worth even less, has been favoured at the others’ expense, while
a new and energetic auxiliary has been found in Ferhau el-Aida
and his Anazeh. lo the latter and to the co-operation of a
French Algerian detachment, Abdullah has chiefly owed such
enchanced success as he claims in his raiding operations during
the past five months. I he real improvement of his military
situation, however, consists more in the relative decline of enemy
strength opposed to him than in increase in his own forces ; and
this is absolutely true of Ali, whose-army in itself is not so
numerous as it w r as a year ago, and has not added to its gun power.
1 uu u teady d f ay ° £ l)oth fche enem y’s 2 nd Composite Force
an n a! Yd V°^ 0nly relatlvel y dn proves the situation of both Ali
ami Abdullah, but may be reckoned to some extent to their credit—
o e a er or the serious losses in men and rolling stock
sir amec yy ie enem\ through the action of his forces on the