File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎102r] (212/834)

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— 59 —
railway and the facilities he has afforded for desertion ; of the former
for his blockade which, according to recent report, has closed all
roads into Medina since the beginning of last December, and
stopped any further supply of fresh meat. Intelligence reports
published from time to time in the Bulletin have illustrated the
decline of the enemy’s L. of C. troops on the southern section of
the line, and Medina garrison, among whom the average battalion
strength has fallen to below 200 effectives, scurvy is rife, morale
is low, mounted troops and aeroplanes are no longer available,
and food is so short that all civilians have been sent out of
Medina. In relation to Feisal both the composite forces have
also declined in strength, neither having been able to retain their
mounted units, or to replace damaged aeroplanes. From lack of
reinforcement, withdrawal of units to the north, and the effect of
Arab raids, the man power of both forces has declined even more
seriously than that of the H.E.F. Neither Maan nor Tebuk
would be able any longer to keep out Feisal’s regular forces, were
these able for their part to push an assault home. The left wing
of the northern Arab army is, of course, in less favourable case
owing to its gradual approach towards the bases of the Turkish
Fourth Army. By concentrations and reinforcements from Deraa
the enemy’s forces opposed to it grow, rather than diminish, in
strength, but at the expense of reserves which would be available
otherwise for the Palestine front.
So far so good : but there are less satisfactory features of
the situation. The Arab regular troops, on whose recruitment,
equipment, and training so much has been expended, remain an
inefficient and unreliable element of both armies. Their
material is in great part bad, because it is drawn from ^warlike
settled populations like the Meccan, or from races with little
sense of discipline, like the liejaz fellahin Arabic for ‘peasant’. It was used by British officials to refer to agricultural workers or to members of a social class employed primarily in agricultural labour. , or from formei
constituents of the Ottoman army, serving voluntarily alter bem 0
prisoners of war, but mostly of indifferent morale, insubordinate,
o“influenced by divergent political aims. The old antagonism
of Syria versus Iraq is rife m the army, and both elements
disaoTee with the Hejazis. Officers are more seriously affected
by this partisan spirit than their men, and, with a few exceptions
they have proved an almost worthless^ lot, under whom troops
ha we little chance of being either trained or led to airy go
military purpose. The Syrian officers are worst m respect of
political intriguing, and they have given much evidence of an
anti-European chauvinism which has mcreased of late, th^ks t
suspicions about secret agreements among the Allies. I he lesu
has 1 been that the volunteer officers have been an obstruction, o
the whole, rather than a help to getting on with the war, especially
in Abdullah’s force, where the indolent character of the Lmn ha
offered inducement and scope to their chauvinism.
’Idie Bedouin elements are little concerned with such politics,
and by retaining none of them long in the field at one time and
calling in ever fresh elements to replace those outworn oi dis-
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