'File XXV/2 Arabian Affairs (including Iraq). Qatar and al Hassa (Bin Saud)' [‎23v] (46/56)

4
Serai. After a short interview in the Serai Bin Sand called for horses and we rode
to the camp with him accompanied by a large crowd of horsemen, who on the way
gave us an “ ardtha ” or welcoming ceremony, which consists in galloping furiously
to and fro in front of honoured guests, shouting, brandishing swords, firing off
rifles, etc.
5. Bin Saud told us that he had arrived about half-an-hour before we did and
was exceedingly cordial and friendly. The friendly personal relations existing be
tween him and Captain Shakespear, resulting from their meetings at Kuwait and in
the desert, put us on good terms at once, and made our subsequent interviews
easy. On arrival at the camp we found that Bin Saud had caused a very large tent
to be pitched for us, and done all he could in other ways to make us comfortable,
inter alia by getting one of the best cooks in Bahrain over and entertaining us
sumptuously in Arab style during the whole of our two days’ stay.
6. On the day of our arrival and the greater part of the next day, Tuesday
(16th December), we discussed with him the points mentioned in the memorandum
attached to Sir Percy Cox’s letter under reply. The result of these discussions is
set forth in Memorandum I attached to this letter. After we had discussed these
points Bin Saud raised the question of the policy of the British Government in Katar
and Trucial Oman A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. with special reference to their attitude in regard to enemies of his
who might take sanctuary in these states and then use them as a base for intriguing
against him, or as a retreat after inciting some Bedouin tribe to revolt against him.
He said that of course he had not the slightest objections to fugitives from his
wrath taking refuge with the neighbouring Shaikhs in accordance with the usual
Arab custom, provided that they did not use their sanctuary as a base for intrigue ;
but if they did so he would be compelled to take steps for his own safety. The gist
of this conversation is recorded in Memorandum II attached to this letter.
7. After business had been concluded at the final interview Bin Saud volun
teered to show us in confidence the conditions which had been proposed by the
Turkish Government and himself as a basis for settlement of his future position.
The document he produced and read out to us was in the form of a draft agreement
containing 11 articles, five of which had been suggested by Bin Saud himself and
the other six by the Turkish Government. The terms proposed by Bin Saud in
sisted on complete autonomy for the region actually controlled by him, special
reference being made to his right to the coast-line and to the appointment and
control of all local officials. The terms proposed by the Turkish Government
laid down a partial autonomy for Bin Saud under the suzerainty of the Sultan
with the following conditions :—
(1) The re-instatement of the former Turkish garrisons in the Hasa pro-
vince.
( 2 ) Kazis and other judicial officers to be appointed by diiect “firman”
by the Sultan.
(3) The exclusion of all foreign merchants and agents of Foreign Powers.
(4) All communications from Foreign Powers or their representatives to
be referred to the Turkish authorities for disposal.
(5) The payment of an annual revenue of £T.3,000.
(6) No concessions to be given by Bin Saud to any foreign companies for
railways or motor-car services.
8. A 'pro'pos of condition (6) above some conversation took place, from which
we gathered that Bin Saud would not be averse to giving concessions under British
auspices, should his position be regularized or in some way assured through our
good offices.
9. I would add that during the discussions, on more than one occasion, Bin
Saud made it clear that he would prefer that any reconciliation between himself
and the Turks should be carried through und(* the auspices of the British Govern
ment, because he had no faith in the permanency of an^ arrangement made direct
ly with that Turkish Government.
10. Before leaving Bin Saud sent instructions to his Deputy at Katij that he
should permit British subjects to enter and trade and open shops, should they arrive