'File XXV/2 Arabian Affairs (including Iraq). Qatar and al Hassa (Bin Saud)' [‎24r] (47/56)

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at Katif and should protect them ; and that he should communicate with the Poli-
ica Agent at Bahrain regarding them should any questions arise.
* ^ ^ ie f° rm al and private discussions which took place Bin Baud was
mos xrendly ; he seemed very much in earnest and most anxious to do whatever
ire could to meet the wishes of Government and to obtain their support. We
^ ^ T itish Government could not give him any assurance
that they would keep the peace, as he expressed it, on the Hasa coast; this of course
rs what he wanted, but he realized that it was impossible. The tangible results
o our interviews with him were that he at once agreed to accept and protect British
raders in k at if (and no doubt in other places on the coast should they want to go
there) and to postpone making any settlement with the Turks until he marches
nor h in the spring, i.e., for three mcnths. Bin Baud also stated in a more ir formal
manner that he would not interfere in the politics of Katar and the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates.
states, and I think that Memorandum II shows that he has no desire to act con-
trar y to "G 16 wishes of Government in these regions. Further, I am of opinion,
u ^ a P^ ln Shakespear shares my view, that there is not the slightest doubt that
should His Majesty s Government consider it desirable to use their good offices to
effect a settlement between Bin Baud and the Porte, by which he would remain
de jure ruler under Turkish suzerainty of the territories cf which he is at
present ‘ de facto ’ ruler, Bin Baud would be only too glad to make a formal arrange
ment with the British Government cn the remainder of the four points men
tioned m Bir Percy Cox s memorandum, viz : to co-operate in the suppression of
piracy and the arms traffic, and in the preservation of the Maritime Truce. In
connection with the Arms Traffic question I may mention that Bin Baud has made
an application to be allowed to import rifles for the use of his troops : this is being
dealt with separately in my letter No. 806 of the 20th December 1913, but it shows,
I think, that Bin Baud means to work with the British Government in the matter.
12. In the course of our conversations with Bin Baud we gathered indirectly
that he would probably accept autonomy under the suzerainty of His Imperial
Majesty the Sultan with the payment of a trifling revenue (or tribute) to Turkey
if necessary, as an acknowledgment of the suzerainty. Should' His Majesty’s Gov
ernment see fit to try and effect a settlement between Bin Baud and the Turkish
Government, it would seem desirable, I respectfully submit, to take some definite
steps within the next two months, i.e.,—say before the 1st March,—of which at least
a hint could be communicated by me to Bin Baud before he goes north in the spring
in cider to save him from making some arrangement with the Turks -which might
be hostile to our interests. In the meanwhile if one or two British subjects who
have been pressing me to allow them to go to Katif are permitted to go there, it
will strengthen our position in resisting the conditions regarding the exclusion of
foreigners, which the Turks particularly desire to impose upon Bin Baud.
13. In conclusion I would observe that only Bin Baud, Captain Shakespear,
and myself were present at any of the interviews at which politics were discussed,
and I should like to say that the exceedingly friendly and cordial attitude of Bin
Baud at the meeting was due to his friendly feelings towards Captain Shakespear.
The latter’s knowledge of the language and ways of the Bedouin from Central
Arabia was also most helpful and his presence was mainly responsible for any
favourable results which may follow from the meeting.
/
I .—Memorandum of interview with Bin Baud on 15-16th December 1913.
In order to make his position clear Bin Baud began by giving an account of the
history of Nejd, from his point of view, of which the following paragraph is a
resume:—
His family, he said, had been in Nejd from time immemorial and had for gene
rations ruled over it without interference from outside. He himself was an Arab
Chief whose views on matters of policy naturally differed from those of European
Powers. Bedouin tribes are not concerned in weighing the merits of different
Governments as they Jive as nomads, and when oppressed move off to another lo
cality. When Ibn Rashid attacked the Bin Baud family, the latter eventually won