Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎275v] (550/644)

A
disorders which occurred. They also made efforts to bring about a truce among
the warring inter-tribal elements, and arranged for Umar Khan of the Shekak
tribe to be recognised as the Chief of the Kurds. Certain Kurdish leaders
thereafter began to go about with a national flag of their own, and the whole
episode aroused the greatest misgiving on the part of the Persian Government,
who feared that an attempt was being made by the Russians to encourage
separatist aspirations, though in point of fact it seems certain that Russia^
as a result of the detente in her relations with Turkey, had now no further
interest in encouraging the Kurds. At the end of the year the situation amongst
the Kurds was most uncertain, control on the Turkish and Iraqi frontier, so
essential to prevent the harvest being smuggled away, was absolutely non-existent,
and adventurous elements among the tribes were producing a state of unrest
throughout the Kurdish tribal areas, which were still entirely out of the Persian
Government's control.
Russian Interests.
85. Russian policy in Persia has very largely remained an enigma. The
Persians, who are fundamentally terrified of the Russians and feared the worst
after the occupation, have on the whole been surprised that they have not had
to suffer Very much from them. During most of the year, moreover, Russian policy
seemed to be more or less of a hand-to-mouth nature, owing, no doubt, to the fearful
problems which the German drive in South Russia set them.
85a. In the first part of the year under review, however, the Persians
continued to make complaints of active Russian interference, particularly in the
north. In particular they made strong representations to the Soviet Government
in March and April, protesting against the alleged propagandist activities of the
Soviet Vice-Consulate at Rezaieh, which was stated to have invited the population
to register for Soviet nationality. They also complained that sepaiatist tendencies
were being encouraged, contrary to the treaty, by an organisation called The
Workers’ Party,” which was under Soviet auspices. It is only fair to say that
these complaints were not repeated later on in the year. The Persian Government
also complained because they were not granted permission to send more troops
to Azerbaijan. „ , o • ^
86. The Rezaieh incident, in May, and the policy of the Soviet authorities
towards the Kurds are described in the section of this report dealing with
Kurdistan, and it need only be stated here that the effect of the encouragement
which the Soviet authorities gave to a Kurdish movement for unity on Persia s
relations with the Soviet Union was to strengthen the Persian belief that the
Russians had ultimate designs themselves on Azerbaijan, notwithstanding the
provisions of the treaty. ,
87. Nevertheless, the official Russian policy seemed, generally speaking (and
with notable exceptions), to be one of non-interference in the general affairs of
Persia and regardless of what one would have thought were their own war
interests, they carried this policy to such lengths as seriously to embarrass the
work of this legation in ensuring the security of communications with Russia
and in assisting in the carriage of supplies northwards. There are several major
instances of this. Thus virtually no assistance could be obtained from the
Russians in securitv matters; they would not back up our requests for the arrest
of known fifth-columnists, though their security authorities co-operated with
ours to some extent, in exchanging information, and on one or two occasions we
were helped to secure the removal of suspects from the Russian zone. I he boviet
authorities were completely unhelpful in food questions, either m backing up our
attempts to secure proper control of hoarding, or to ensure the purchase oft e
necessary quantities from the harvest to feed the towns, and they made difficulties
about releasing food from their zone in order to feed Tehran, or even to inform
us adequately of what quantities they proposed to take away from Persia. It was
made clear to the Soviet Government that, while we would not, of course, wish to
obiect to their supplying their own needs from Persia, this might mean that
sunnlies in replacement of those taken away, would have to be brought from
overseas’and transported, in Persia, by rail and that this would necessarily
displace a certain quantity of war supplies destined for Russia Perhaps it was
to escape this inconvenient dilemma that the Russians hid their hand His
MUestv’s Government made representations to the Russian Ambassador in
London in November, and were informed officially that permission had been given
for 35 000 tons of cereals to he brought from Azerbaijan to Tehran; but hai y
anv cereals ever came and the Soviet Government gave so little help to the Persian
Government to purchase the necessary quantities for this purpose (indeed, they