Coll 6/8(1) 'Printed Series: 1929 to 1938.' [‎318v] (641/1062)

, , , , -o- Q n1ir i hofore, but Colonel Dickson of course knew him
~ 3- I ^ not m a’good deal since he last saw him and hi 8
Wel1 “ M changed : whereas 8 formerly his manner had been
manners Had , f * tl o ha ikii he has now assumed to a much greater
those of an important Arab bha 1 h e r s o iiag e j largely due probably t / thein .
extent lh ® • and Egyptians of the effendi type by whom he is now
surrounded ^ 6 He did not invit?me to dinner in accordance with the usual Arab
custom and our partv were kept at some distance from his camp the King coming
to our “mp tor all discussions. The ostensible reason was that the King was
hying to the simplest style and was not m a position suitably to entertain dis-
tSshed visitors and that he had with him a number of fanatical and ignorant
tXsmen • the real reason, I think, was that certain Shaikhs from Iraqi nbes
and others' were visiting his camp and Bin Sand was anxious that we should
not become aware of this.
4 In their instructions to me His Majesty’s Government had said that they
would much prefer to avoid deporting the rebel eaders, if possible and I felt
that there was much force in the reasons advanced by them, though at first sight
deportation certainly seemed the simplest course After a full consideration,
however of all the issues involved and as a result of my discussions with Bin
Saud and the impression I formed of his feeling’s and character, I believe it
would have been a mistake, for the following reasons. His Majesty’s govern
ment have in the past given many signs of their friendship for Bm Sand : they
have supplied him with arms and ammunition and even with aeroplanes with
British personnel : they have taken the most drastic measures to ensure that
no facilities should be accorded to the rebel tribes ; and their general attitude
has been one of readiness to assist him as far as was in their power in his
struggle with his rebellious subjects. They had, of course, never offered to
surrender the rebels to him unconditionally and had warned him that a con
tingency might arise under which they would be unable to eject the rebels from
Kuwait or Iraq territory. If however when this contingency arose, His
Majesty’s Government had declined to surrender the rebel leaders to him des
pite the very categorical undertaking he was prepared to give to prevent raids
by Nejdi tribes into Kuwait and Iraq territory in the future, and his undertak
ing to s'pare the lives of all the rebels and make a prompt settlement of claims,
then, I venture to think, Bin Saud would have had some justification for feeling
that, while the action of His Majesty’s Government did not constitute a breach
of faith, it was inconsistent with their former professions of friendship and^im-
plied a change of attitude. I am certain that he would have gone back to Nejd
completely antagonised. To speak of the terms arranged as capitulation seems
to me to ignore the past relations existing between His Majesty’s Government
and Bin Saud. Had he gone off to Nejd without the rebel leaders being handed
over to him, what would have been the position 1 It would not have been pos
sible permanently to stop the rebel Mutair and Ajman from returning to Nejd
territory, which is their home : Bin Sand would thus have been provided with
a weapon ready to his hand, and, though it is time that these tribes would have
been deprived of. their principal leaders, others would have been forthcom
ing, and with .Bin Saud in hostile mood and these tribes again at
his disposal I think there would have been a strong probabilitv of a recrudes-
ence of organised raiding all along the border in the near future. It is of
course possible that Bin Sand may not fulfil his undertakings, though person
ally I believe that he intends to do so, and that organised raiding under his
orders and with his encouragement will cease for at any rate some time to come.:
but I do think that the risk of organised raiding is very much less now than it
. , „ # 0 - petty cattle-lifting
nia} lecur irom time to time is of course possible : they are more or less in
the nature of a local pastime, and of little importance and are totally different
makers to organised raiding carried out with the encouragement or under
the orders of the King.
. , 5 ’ T . here if one otlier consideration to be borne in mind and that is the pro
jected air route down the Gulf. A portion of this route runs through Nejd
an iavo 1 i 11 fhc past, to obtain certain facilities from Bin
etc., but these facilities have hitherto
Govor^w 1 ; P ° SS i bly olie 1 of the considerations that induced His Majesty s
.1 to ™Vv}Y aeroplanes to Bin Sand was that these might induce him
They will I think be on stronger ground to renew their
to change liis attitud<
beeirthe 'J! acc ede to them now than would have
Deen the case had the rebel leaders been deported.