Coll 6/8(1) 'Printed Series: 1929 to 1938.' [‎320r] (644/1062)

p r ^i5|
ad 110 iL 2:
«* toning
^istliiij,
[ imki
dsinteutiii;;
ionofHisl
'aq trikifi';
' the final stii
based la^j
inevitail!'!
friction, ek I
mug that If?
?ery diffeKi!;:
two preits;
in order tu
rn antieipitij
,q and Ink
ical difalfe
i snbstaitiii'
with the
t of Skialiii
em to
i the fit!eft
mm
embodyiB# :
were ^
and soob^
ostanrionsV
hat the#
norning
onel Dieted
ff Ofe ? W r
! forgij#;
that night 111
imposed on the rebel leaders and the tribes. As explained in my telegram No. 38
of the 28th January Bin Sand resented dictation in this matter : he contended
that he had given a definite promise to prevent raids, but that the exact manner
in which he was to implement this must be left to him. To have pressed the
point would have meant further discussions, and as I have pointed out above an
early settlement was essential, and I could not help feeling* that the matter was
one rather of theoretical than of practical importance. Firstly, as regards the
leaders it would have been very difficult to have ascertained whether in fact they
were being kept in Riyadh or at any other place. Secondly, as telegraphed in my
comments on the agreement, if Bin Sand means to stop raiding* lie may be trusted
to exercise effective control over both the leaders and the tribes : if he does not
intend to fulfil this undertaking then any promises regarding the control to be
exercised over the rebel tribes will certainly prove equally illusory. I think how-
everthat not merely in fulfilment of his undertakings to His Majesty’s Government
hut in his own interests he will take drastic measures to prevent all risk of a fur
ther rebellion against his authority. As regards the tribes it was not his inten
tion to restrict them to one specified area : considerations of grazing and water
would prevent this : but I think he intends to control their movements generally
and not to allow them to move about anywhere they place, for some time to come
at any rate.
11. As regards Bin Sand’s promises to settle claims promptly in future my
hands were somewhat tied by the machinery of the Bahra Agreement in the case
of Iraq. Bin Saucl would of course have been glad of any excuse to modify
the terms of the Bahra Agreement and expressed his readiness to settle claims
for raids on Iraq on demand, but said that he assumed that any such arrange
ment would supersede any arrangement prescribed in the Bahra Agreement, lo
this of course I could not agree, and the only course possible was to try to tighten
im the Bahra Agreement ; and Bin Sand offered spontaneously to appoint repre
sentatives to the tribunal prescribed in the Bahra Agreement at any time one
month after the receipt of a request to this effect by the Iraq Government, the
only stipulation he made being that the month of Zi-Haj (pilgiimage) s ion t
be excluded from the computation of the month allowed to as sal ?Jf n a „
he made the pilgrimage himself every year and had many preoccupations during
that month He contended, however, that the failure to form a tribunal to in
vestigate claims in the past was not due to him and that he had on two occamons
sent Hafiz Wabha to Kuwait as his representative and that the latter had s1 A
there for six months on one occasion and for two or three months ™ mother,
and that tin Traq Government had failed to send representatives I did not
know whether th^ statement was correct and Xmenfofd^m
the matter. As regards Kuwait the current prmitice for the settlement ot clai^
is for the Ruler of Kuwait to address Bin Sand direct and .or cla ms
iusted bv direct correspondence. This procedure has proved quite meffectua
Ste pasrilnd I C douht P whether it is likely to P.^rtStiTte^n agreem n
future, but Bin Saud stated that he was quite ^‘“8 ^ | es ire it.
with Kuwait on the lines of the Bahra Agreement should ^
Finally he agreed to pay £10,000 m anticipation of a final settlement
It will be seen that, firstly, the leaders have gone back
will ; secondly, we have obtained a.promise ro a categorical pro-
them and the tribesmen with humanity ; thirdly, Mejias ^.ve ^ ^ | nture? and
mise to prevent any raids by Nejd tribes m o 11 their settlement has
should any raids occur despite his e ^°fJ s ^| le Government* choose to avail
been considerably tightened up and if e_ ^ . coini 3ensation. Finally,
themselves of it no undue delay should occur in obtaim^ ap _
despite the fact that Bin Saud contends t against Nejd, a substantial
proximately to the same figure as the Iraq claims against iNeja,
sum has been obtained from him on accoun .
12. As regards the allocation as between "hIs Excellency’the
I am confronted by a similar^ difficulty to that e p ^ Yonoi the 3l s t January,
High Commissioner for Iraq m his telegra • c ] a i m ‘ s , or the proportion they
inasmuch as I do not know the amount o . , ^ ;gi n gaud claims to
hear to the Kuwait claims. I would ho \ e ^ e p r taTnot -ot any counter-claims
have heaw counter-claims against Iraq, w a ^ ^ payment on account
Lc472FD