Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎184v] (368/544)

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thirdly, if it were adhered to, I fear it could only be a source of incessant friction
between the French and ourselves, and the Arabs as third parties, in the future.
The next great fact we have to deal with is this, that in the military operations
conducted by General Allenby in those regions France did nothing, or at any rate only
offered the most microscopic contribution to the conquest of those territories, while the
Arabs, on the other hand, did a great deal. Thirdly, the Arabs, by their conjoint
success with General Allenby’s forces, have now installed a native form of government
in Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. Those areas are in A. Further than that,
they have, I believe, done the same thing and set up some form of native institutions
in the Anti-Lebanon and the port of Latakia on the coast. Meanwhile, the French,
taking full advantage of the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, have sought to
push in their Governors and their functionaries everywhere, only being restrained by
the fact of the military situation and the control which General Allenby has been in a
position to exercise. It appears, from all the evidence at our disposal, that they have
not made at all a good start with the business, and that the}'' are regarded with the
utmost distrust by the Arabs. Indeed, a little while ago we heard from General Clayton
and other authorities out there that if the Syrians were now, in the existing circum
stances, called upon to choose a single Great Power as their tutelar Power in the future,
they would be much more likely to choose Great Britain than France.
The telegrams which have arrived from Sir Mark Sykes during the last week
exhibit a development in the situation which is rather curious and significant. We
have hitherto been speaking of the native Government, set up at Damascus, as if the
difficulties that were likely to arise would be between the Arabs, on the one hand, and
the French or ourselves, on the other, but not between the different elements of the
Arabs viewed as a community apart. But now it appears that there is some friction
arising between the conception of a Syrian Government and the background of Sherifian
influence connecting such a Government with the Hejaz. Sir Mark Sykes talks to us
about the ideas prevalent in Damascus and elsewhere, that there is too little Syria and
too much Hejaz. I can quite conceive that in the next few weeks or months we may
have the growth of a cry of “ Syria for the Syrians ” rather than “ Syria for the Sherif.”
That is a symptom which we have to take note of as we go along. A further novel
symptom that appears from Sir Mark Sykes’ telegrams is this, that in the north,
particularly at and near Aleppo, the Turkish prestige of which we thought we had got
rid has, if anything, increased rather than diminished since the armistice. I merely
note it in passing, and I will only say this about it. The explanation given is that
the Turkish troops are still in the neighbourhood of Aleppo, and that Faisal, no
doubt for reasons of expediency, has been compelled to make a very considerable
employment of Turks in order to enable him to carry on the administration. I have
now finished my second heading, the facts of the case historically dealt with, bringing us
up to the present time.
Finally, we come to the question of what our policy is and should be. May I for
one moment deal with the question of the Lebanon, which, for the historical reasons I
have named, has a certain identity and separate existence of its own. I pointed out
a little earlier that the French claims there were, at any rate in my judgment, really
not consistent with the position secured for the inhabitants of the Lebanon by the
arrangements of 18G1 and 1864. But, if self-determination is the test to be applied in
the Lebanon as in other parts of Syria, I imagine, from the evidence placed before us,
that the French would, even under the new conditions, secure a majority. It appears
that the greater part of the Maronites in the country are pro-French, while the greater
part of the Druses, who are in the minority, are anti-French. I therefore assume for
the moment—the Foreign Office will correct me if 1 am wrong—that the French will
probably try to stick to the Lebanon whatever happens to the rest ol Syria. If that is
so, we must pause for a moment to consider what are the borders of the Lebanon area
to which they should in all probability be confined. I imagine there will be a general
agreement that they should hold the coastline from Beirut in the north to the borders
of the real Palestine, I think it is the Litani Biver, in the south. A rather more
difficult question is the future of the region to the east of the Lebanon range, which is
called El Bukaa, and which runs from Homs in the north to Banias or Lake Huleh in
the south. Colonel Lawrence, in his paper, suggested that Faisal would put in a claim
to this area. On the other hand, General Clayton, in his telegrams, suggests that it
should be given to the French. Elsewhere Faisal has said that he will be willing that
the Lebanon—whether he referred to the larger or the smaller area I do not exactly
know—should retain its independent existence unless or until it wishes to join the
Syrian State, and that the French should assist in its administration if invited to do so