Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎185r] (369/544)

9
One of our authorities at this moment puts in the query : What will the United States
say ? They have a formidable missionary interest at Beirut, they are much concerned
in that part of the world, and it may be, although we need not pause to dilate upon it
here, that a French future for the Lebanon might not altogether be received with
enthusiasm by them.
Next we come to the area immediately north of the Lebanon, which runs along the
coast from Arsus, south of Alexandretta, to Tripoli, and includes the seaport—for what
it is worth—of Latakia, Tripoli, and the railway from Tripoli to Homs.
(At this 'point Mr. Balfour entered the room.)
Faisal lays great stress, and in fact insists, upon this being part of the Arab or Syrian
State which he is setting up.
Then, pursuing our investigations further to the north, we come to the area in the
Gulf of Iskanderun, from Arsus to Payas, north of Alexandretta, the confines of this
portion of the country, on the land side, probably being the crest of the Amanus Bange.
This area includes Alexandretta, which, under the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, was
to go to the French, but to be a free port for British trade. If the French destination for
this area survives, let us note in passing that Faisal claims that the same commercial
privileges or right of usage as a free port shall be conceded to him as are conceded to
the British. North again of this area we come to the region which we were dealing
with the other day, and which I need not further mention this afternoon, namely,
Cilicia and the Armenians.
thus we see we are getting into this position, that we are face to face with what
looks very much like a rather complicated and dangerous system of partition of the coast
line of Palestine up to the Gulf of Alexandretta :—
1. Palestine in the south, whatever be its future ;
2. A French strip of the Lebanon ;
3. An Arab or Syrian strip, including Tripoli and Latakia ; and
4. A French enclave An area of land belonging to one country and entirely surrounded by land of just one other country. , including the port of Alexandretta in the north.
lhat seems to be the position to which we are being driven. Of course there is an
alternative to this, namely, the plan of getting France out of Syria altogether, by
paying her a price elsewhere—which may have to be very considerable—offering her
Armenia or some other, large sphere of political influence in Asia Minor. Here, again,
I suppose if we consulted our own feelings we should all of us like to get the French out
of Syria altogether, both because we fear that they will be bad neighbours to us not
only in Palestine, if we remain there, but in the Arab areas adjoining, over which we
must exercise considerable influence, and because, in the event of trouble with the
french in the future, the presence of the French in this part of Syria would undoubtedly
impose heavy military responsibilities upon Egypt. What, however, are we to do ?
Beading the Papers, I find two strains of opinion. Some say “ Back the French at the
expense of faisal; after all, the French are a great Power, and you have to be on good
terms with her in different parts of the wmrld ; you have committed yourselves—
foolishly or otherwise—by the Sykes-Picot Agreement; see her through to the best of
your ability, and do not be too much concerned about the Arabs/’ On the other hand
there is another party, of whom I think Colonel Lawrence is the spokesman, who say,
1 he fact that you are involved with the French by agreements out of which you want
to extricate yourselves is no reason why you should be at all unfair to the Arabs ; and,
viewing the facts that you are a great Eastern Power, that you have assumed this
responsibility in Mesopotamia, that the whole of this area is or ought to be British in
general political inclination, your policy is to back Faisal rather than the French.”
Of course we are involved in these difficulties in the main by the Sykes-Picot
Agreement, and one question I should like to put at this stage to the Foreign
Office—and I am glad to see that Mr. Balfour is here—is this : Is it possible that,
when we sit down to the Peace Conference, President Wilson might say, and might get
us out of a great difficulty by saying, “ Here we are inaugurating a new era of free and
open diplomacy ; the various States of Europe have bound themselves by all sorts of
unscrupulous secret engagements in the earlier years of the war; before we enter into
any arrangements for the future let us sw'eep all those off the board ; let the Sykes-
Picot Agreement go, let the Agreement with the Italians go, and let us start with a
clean slate ? ’ It is a question I cannot answer, and it may be one which, even if
President Wilson puts it, which I think not unlikely, our Allies, whatever attitude we
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