'Seistan' [‎331r] (663/782)

within measurable distance of being broken, we are yet of opinion that
they are in themselves quite insufficient to arrest the centripetal progress of
liussian influence in Persia, or to save either the Persian kingdom, or British
interests in it, from the erosive agencies that we have described. Within the
limits of a nominally still existing integrity and independence so many
encroachments upon both those attributes are possible, that by almost imper
ceptible degrees they pass into the realm of constitutional fiction, where they
may continue to provide an exercise for the speculations of the jurist, long
after they have been contemptuously ignored by statesmen.
53. If tins proposition be accepted, and if we cannot rely upon written
pledges to safeguard the future of Persia, it behoves us to examine the various
alternative policies that have been or can be proposed. The first of these is
the policy of a regeneration of Persia by Anglo-Bussian means; i.e., joint
action by Great Britain and Russia to insist upon reforms, to reorganise the
administration and finances, to develop the resources of the country, to lend
the requisite means, in fact to convert the Persian Government by combined
philanthropy from a moribund into a solvent institution. This policy was dis
cussed and rejected by Sir M. Durand in his Memorandum of September 1895,
on the ground that Russia would denounce us to the Shah to begin with, and
would play us false afterwards; and in his despatch of Pebruary 1899, he
again “ proceeds upon the assumption that we cannot hope to come to terms
with Russia, and persuade her to join us in a policy of reform and development”.
We concur with Her Majesty’s Minister in believing that the reform of Persia
by a policy of friendly co-operation between Russia and ourselves is out of the
question; and we do so in the main for the reason, which no one familiar
with Persia will deny, that Russia is interested not in the reform of Persia,
but in its decay; that in the background of her ambitions is the vision of a
country and a people falling from inherent debility into her grasp; and that
any policy which might tend to strengthen the country or to revivify the
people, is to be resisted as tending to thwart the fulfilment of those ambi
tions. We might give many illustrations in support of this proposition; but
we will content ourselves with one. Sir M. Durand has lately supplied to the
Foreign Office the version given by the Sadr Azam of the agreement between
the Persian and Russian Governments, by which the former bound itself in 1889
not to grant any railway concessions to any other Power than Russia, except
with the consent of the latter, for a period of 10 years. Whatever be the real
facts of the case, there can be no doubt that this engagement, as long as it
has lasted, and so long as it continues to last, is an effective barrier to any
genuine development of the country. It was due to expire in the present
year. Our latest information from Sir M. Durand is that it has, under pressure
from the Russian Government, been renewed for another term of five years.
54. The alternative policy recommended by Sir M. Durand is that we
should plainly intimate that any Russian encroachments in Northern Persia will
provoke corresponding measures for the protection of British interests in the
south. In his Memorandum of September 1895, Her Majesty’s Minister
suggested that this declaration should be made to the Russian Government. In
his despatch of February 1899 he proposed that it should also be made to the
Persian Government; so that both parties should be well aware of the steps
that would follow upon any further Russian aggression. It has been objected
to this policy that such an engagement might impose upon the British Govern
ment an unwelcome obligation to intervene and to add to British responsibi
lities in Southern Persia, at the moment most opportune to Russia, and least
opportune to ourselves. There is force in this objection; although w~e think
that it might be met by introducing sufficient elasticity into the proposed
intimation to leave Her Majesty’s Government free to act for the protection
of British interests in Southern Persia, not in a specified manner at a specified
moment, but in what manner and at what juncture might commend itself
to their judgment. Moreover the value of the objection is somewhat weakened
by the consideration that did Russia take any such step in Northern Persia as is
here contemplated, counter-action of some sort, with or without a previous
intimation, would in all probability be imposed upon Her Majesty’s Government;
while the knowledge that a Russian advance in the north might be the signal