'Seistan' [‎342r] (685/782)

[ 7 ]
the'He^mancL^Thi^'proposal'wa^nvi'f for US ^^l* , ® el ' s * ;an, ' 3U ^ : to Safar on
for strategical reasons ^amelv fn nv 1 Wltll0ut an 7 reference to Persia,
llussian advance upon Kandahar If * ^ ^ P r ®7 entj at an 7 future period, a
study of the papers, what I did not v? 1 ? terestm ^ to me ta learn from a
I was travelling in Persia, and was fir^- r 016 ’ ^*’ ^ la .f ^ ye years later, when
been raised both in India ami in P * • V 1U ^ a J0U ^ ^ lls question, it had just
time head of the Tntenten” DemZei i'T? ^ C °. l0ne 1 1 Bel1 - at that
1888 marched from India hv TClTn , I 1 d , la ’ who . ln the autumn of
recommended the construction of n rail ^ to . Seistan, and strongly
from the Persian Government with a v^’ 10386 “ P CI Tetuity of Seistan
concession to Ueuter or to some other Cr m.° * 16 r?,' ant ° f a ." rcat irrigation
taken up by Sir H D Wolff wW„ ® C ? m P“y- The suggestion was eagerly
halcyon dro y ams of a re ^mtu 'fTcZT W3S at ‘Y ti “ e suff ^d°with
recommended bv him both to the Povo f r ^ m i) eis ul railways; and was
Lord Lansdow/e’s Gov^ment ^ I t T Kt of 1 I ? d 1 la T and ^ Lord Salisbury,
that “Railway extension through RalnM,Iff?™’ dated Jan , U j ry , 20th ’ 188 ?’. said
authorities as a most valuable atfiunct to t] S re f a ^ d ®4 the military
of the utmost encouragement-^ Slr k ™ UCeS ° f as deserving
advance, but were reiterated hv liim ; f" ? , 8 l ,l0 l' 0sa ^ dld not make much
July 25th, and Au®usTl9th i 8qr n ? P f ° ll f 1 t0 - tbe , Eorei S n 0fiice - da ted
despatch of February 19 th 1889 £r “ fTl aS f his ori S“ a l
advocated^LTwom e a ly COn ’ tenti ° i;S ^ ^acceptable frZd^ H°e
mid as ^ s^oYrCg
the offensive against that Power. This line of argument was completely riddled
tLeHeTdZft’lm’ d I at , cd 9 ctober fnd, 1890, by General Brackenbmyfat that
time lieaa ot the Intelligence Department at home. He pointed out that a
remote corner °f Persia could not counterbalance the position
of Russia m that country, would not help us in the least on the Afghan border
-rr n , V'Y 1 ,’ ur and "-ould he of no use for assuming the offensive
He concluded by saying-” By far the more important task is, not the 00 ^
struct ion of a new line into Seistan, but the consolidation of our power there
by bringing the frontier tribes under our influence, and by developin'* Balu
chistan and converting it into a fertile base of operations. When this has been
done, it will be time to push forward into Persia”.
„• ff Gene J al Brackenhury’s criticism was destructive of the proposal
viewed as an offensive and strategical scheme. But a corresponding flaw in his
, arSmnmR was at once pointed out by Lord Salisbury, who noted that the
real object of a Seistan railway would he not to attack Russia in Northern
Peisia, but to save Southern Persia from falling into her grasp, which could
from°the re ^ ^ a ^ ^ Quetta ’ 0r ’ aS he ' VOuld M,:Ilsel£ P refer > a liue
r .r ■' 1 ' General Erackcnbury’s criticism was sent out to the Government of
Indin, ^ and was thus noted upon by Sir G. Chesney on January 13th, 1891
Ihe railway can only be regarded as a work of military precaution. Prom this
point of view it appears to me that the time cannot be far distant when it will
be deemed necessary. Still more important is a railway from the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran.
north to Seistan; but the connecting link between this line and the Quetta
railway system will also be found necessary”.
2 o. A little later Sir H. Brackenbury, now Military Member in India
v. 1 ? n i ) i • u P on the scheme; and it is interesting to read his remarks in the
light of his former opinion. He now explained (April 27th, 1891) that he had
only objected to a Seistan railway so long as the Bussian railway did not
extend south of the Trans-Caspian line, and because to construct a rail wav to
Seistan would compel her to make extensions. “ But if circumstances should
change, and if Russia should take the lead in making rail wavs southward
then it may become necessary for us to follow her lead. We ought to be able
to keep pace with her ”.