'Seistan' [‎342v] (686/782)

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26. These conditions had not yet been realised, and the Government of
India decided to proceed no further with the scheme. The question of a mow
southerly line from the sea was at the same time considered m connection with
Sir It. Sandeman’s proposals to take over Kej and Panjgur-a project which
was revived in 189t by his successor, Sir J. Browne. On both occasions, how
ever (as again at a liter date), the proposal to assume administrative respon
sibility for Makran was negatived by the Government of India, and with it
the idea of a Makran railway from the sea to Seistan was dropped also. Since
then the question has not been revived.
27 It will be clear from the above narrative, firstly, that the idea of
a Seistan railway does not appear to have ever been considered by the Govern
ment of India from the only point of view m which, m my opinion it ought
to be regarded, ms., as a protective, and not an offensive, measure, ffhe reason
perhaps is that, at that time, Russia had not given such unmistakable evidence
of her intention to move southward from Meshed, and to draw Seistan within
the radius of her political influence. The railway was accordingly discussed
and condemned, as a means of attacking Russia in Northern Persia, not as
a means of keeping Russia out of Southern Persia. Moreover at that time, the
Quetta-Seistan trade route not having yet been opened, the possible commer
cial value of the line was not taken into account at all. Secondly, it will be noticed
that the conditions postulated by Sir H. Brackenbury in London as precedent
to any idea of railway construction in this quarter have since been realised.
Baluchistan is rapidly being developed; the frontier tribes have passed com
pletely under our control; a permanent line of communication with Seistan
has been opened; while the very conditions which he said, when in India, might
compel a change of attitude on our part— viz., Russian initiative in the process
of southerly extension from her existing railway ^ system—have been fulfilled
by the construction on her part, without provocation or incentive from us, of
the Merv-Kushk line. It is clear, therefore, that the question stands on a
different footing from any that it has previously occupied; and that the facts
and arguments which weighed with our predecessors are inapplicable to the
present situation.
28. As regards the physical and engineering difficulties by which such a
line might be confronted, I may cite the following opinion from the report in
1897 of Lieutenant Webb Ware: “ No one who has traversed this country can
fail to be struck with the marvellous facilities which the country between
Nushki and Seistan offers for the construction of a railway. Scarcely a single
material obstacle exists to bar the road; throughout the gradient is exceedingly
gentle; bands of sand can as a rule be avoided; of fuel there is an abundance;
while not a bridge of more than one span, or engineering work of any magnitude,
is requisite. Added to this the mineral wealth of the Koh-i-Sultan and the
hills to the west, at present lying untouched, is so considerable as in itself to
offer very great inducements to railway enterprise. Such a railway would place
the trade of Eastern Persia and Seistan at our feet, unlock such Central Asian
markets as are now closed, give us a preponderating influence in Eastern Persia,
and opened to India the rich grain fields of Seistan ”.
29. It would appear, therefore, that so far as gradients, water-crossings,
and fuel are concerned, little or no difficulty would be met with in laying a line
across the 400 and odd miles that intervene between Nushki and Seistan. On
the other hand, I am inclined to think that at present a very serious obstacle
•would present itself in the complete dearth of water over long stretches of this
route, and in the problem of the shifting sands. Both of these difficulties have
been overcome by Russia, though only at great expense, and with the aid of a
large permanent staff, upon her Trans-Caspian Railway. She has had, moreover,
the assistance of a settled population and the advantage of numerous inhabited
sites along the railway line. These advantages would, at any rate, at the start
be wanting in the case of a Quetta-Seistan railway. Eor some time the trade
by such a line, though it would probably develop with great rapidity, w^ould
not be remunerative; while the railway would have no other immediate use.