'Seistan' [‎362v] (726/782)

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tha^ 1 difficult'as find^in”"1 finan^nd
LTJwecon“fnot contem^te' without dismay the prospect of Russian
neighbourhood in Eastern or Southern Persia, the inevitable consequenceof
whfch must he a great increase of our own burdens; while the maritime
defensibility of India would require to he altogether reconsidered, ueie tie
dangers o/a land invasion to he supplemented by the appearance ot a possi de
antagonist as a naval power in waters contiguous to Indian shores.
49 We cannot pretend to divine the future, or to say whether any
European Power, and if so which, will at any time push her advance to the
point of claiming a maritime outlet in or near to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . I e t
of Mesopotamia lies beyond our ken: and it may be that m the collapse of
the Ottoman Empire, some stronger Power may one day exercise dominion
at Baghdad, may occupy Basrah, and may demand access for its vessels
to the neighbouring waters of the Gulf. Such a consummation, it is in
our opinion, in the interests of British policy, as long as may be possible, to
postpone. But upon the question of allowing any European Power, and more
especially Bussia, to overrun Central and Southern Persia, and so to reach the
Gulf or to acquire naval facilities in the latter even without such territorial
connections, we do not conceive that any doubt whatever can be entertained;
and we imagine that it will be accepted as a cardinal axiom of British policy
that no such development wmdd be acquiesced in by Her Majesty s Government.
We would arrive with the greater confidence at this conclusion, since we were
lately informed by Your Lordship that on April loth of the present year, Lord
Salisbury communicated to the Persian Government with reference to rumours
of the cession of a port in the Gulf to Bussia, that “ Her Majesty’s Government
felt it to be their duty to renew the intimation that it would not be compatible
with the interests of the British Empire that any European Power should
exercise control or jurisdiction over the ports of the Persian Gulf”.
50. Such being the existing situation in Southern Persia, and the prin
ciples of policy accepted by Her Majesty’s Government being as already stated,
•we pass to a consideration of the manner in which these principles should be
translated into action, and of the steps which should, in our opinion, be
taken at the present juncture for the protection of the common interests of
Great Britain and the Indian Empire.
51. We are aware that, more than half a century ago, there were
exchanged, and have more than once since been repeated, certain explicit
assurances concerning the integrity and independence of Persia between the
Governments of Great Britain and Bussia. The first of these assurances were
entered into by Lord Palmerston and Count Nesselrode. The former in a
despatch, dated September 5th, 1834, placed on record that “ the Governments
of Great Britain and Bussia are acting, with regard to the affairs of Persia in
the same spirit, and are equally animated by a sincere desire to maintain, not
only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity of
Persia ”. Count Nesselrode, in despatches, dated October 20th, 1838, and
January 29th, 1839, reiterated these pledges on behalf of his Government.
Again in 1873 the continued existence of these mutual assurances was referred
to with satisfaction by Count de Brunnow, as reported in a despatch by Lord
Granville, dated July 10th, 1873. Einally, on March 12th, 1888, M. de Giers
intimated, through M. de Staal, to Lord Salisbury that the Bussian Government
“ have no objection to placing again on record that their views on this point are
in no way altered”; and a communication to the effect that the engagements
between Great Britain and Bussia to respect and promote the integrity and
independence of the Persian kingdom had again been renewed and confirmed,
was accordingly made by Sir H. D. Wolff to the Shah.
52. Whilst it may be presumed that these pledges, so frequently renewed,
are still in existence, and while we have no desire to infer that they are