'Seistan' [‎363r] (727/782)

17 ]
within measurable distance of being broken, we are yet of opinion that
t hey are in themselves quite insufficient to arrest the centripetal prooress of
• ^ sia J l 111 ,1 . < ' n< " e m Persia, or to save either the Persian kingdom, or°British
interests in it, from the erosive agencies that we have described. Within the
limits of a nominally still existing integrity and independence so manv
cen«Me'T ntS Up t T both th ° se att, ' ibutes are possible, that by almost imper
ceptible dogre.s they pass into the realm of constitutional fiction, where they
may continue to provide an exercise for the speculations of the iurist W
after they have been contemptuously ignored by statesmen. °
i , Oo ', If s proposition be accepted, and if we cannot rely upon written
fciVe 8 tiers' 1 H h V , ; tU, ' e 0 u Pe - a ’ 11 beh0 - s 1° examine The valus
r P ohcies that ha ^ e been or can be proposed. The first of these is
actio P n 0 bvTr 0 eT a n e f nerat rn° £ Persia ^ Ani-lo-ftnssian means; L joint
administration^nndT" and t0 , lnS ‘f " p0n reforms ’ t0 reorganise^ the
aammistration and finances, to develop the resources of the country to lend
pblCZTvT^ ^ t0 , COnvert the I >ersian Govermumit byTomblned
?nco i a m( ] )ri bund into a solvent institution. This policy was dis-
on the 'lroimd tint, 1 R Slr - M ' a d “ hiS Memorandum of September 1895,
would riiav us fnW^ H "7 U de , n0 . unce . us to the Shah to begin with, and
no-vu’w <! ^ false alterwards; and in his despatch of Februarv 1899 he
with Ruisi1 Cee< d UP ° n i th ? assum P tion that we cannot hope to come to terms
We confur’ witli ^IrnTl 6 ' “T l?! n US in . a P olic y reform and development
bv a nolifv of frl i ^ a:,est y s . Mi nister m believing that the reform of Persia
oneslion T i ^i ^ ca -°P era tion between Russia and ourselves is out of the
whfpeiia trdenTtT/^ ^ f ° r tb ° reaSOn ’ which no familiar
but in its rWn u V’ f f R i ussia 18 interested not in the reform of Persia,
coun Tand a nTn c Tlr th r back F“ und ° f ber ambitions is the -^on of a
countiy and a people falling from inherent debilitv into her erasn • and tW
any policy which might tend to strengthen the country or tHeiiS Jhe
S e ’ We mhd,t r T Sted as ten n in? ,0 - ‘h"'” 4 the f" 101 ™” 1 * of ‘hose ambi-
° f S 1 ' e many illustrations in support of this proposition • but
ForTinO n ffic:rrJ Ve -" dth0ne -, Sir Durand has lately P sup P plTdto She
the Pemiaflud R?, “T? S1Ven b * V the S,>dr Azam oE the agreement between
no fc to "rant anv rnilw^ Govern ? [ien f s ’ b y which the former bound itself in 1889
whh fh^i ^ c ^ nce f 10ns t0 any other Power than Russia, except
fae of the o latter \ f ° r a P eri0(1 of 10 y ears - Whatever be the real
c . of the case, there can be no doubt that this engagement, as long as it
Genuine 6 dev a el Cl n 0 °t g COntinues to last ’ is an effective barrier to any
genuine development of the country. It was dne to expire in the present
1 tl P information from Sir M. Durand is that it has, under pressure
fiom the Russian Government, been renewed for another term of five years.
, , T he aR ernative policy recommended by Sir M. Durand is that we
plainly intimate that any Russian encroachments in Northern Persia will
provoke corresponding measures for the protection of British interests in I he
south. In his Memorandum of September 1895, Her Majesty’s Minister
suggested that this declaration should be made to the Russian Government. In
his despatch of February 1899 he proposed that it should also be made to the
Persian Government; so that both parties should be well aware of the steps
that would follow upon any further Russian aggression. It has been objected
to this policy that such an engagement might impose upon the British Govern
ment an unwelcome obligation to intervene and to add to British responsibi
lities in Southern Persia, at the moment most opportune to Russia, and least
opportune to ourselves. There is force in this objection; although we think
. f. R m, gbt be met by introducing sufficient elasticity into the proposed
leave . Her W a j es ty’ s Government free to act for the protection
o Biitish interests in Southern Persia, not in a specified manner at a specified
moment,^ but m what manner and at what juncture might commend itself
o ien judgment. Moreover the value of the objection is somewhat weakened
>y the consideration that did Russia take any such step in Northern Persia as is
here contemplated, counter-action of some sort, with or without a previous
intimation, would in all probability be imposed upon Her Majesty’s Government;
while the knowledge that a Russian advance in the north might he the signal