File 4535/1928 Pt 8 ‘ – PERSIAN GULF – QUESTION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF PROTECTORATES OVER KOWEIT, BAHREIN, MUSCAT, TRUCIAL COAST.’ [‎98v] (190/194)

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the internal administration in order to impose some semblance of civilised admin
istration in the Sheikhdom, or to bolster up against the will of the people some
weakling or puppet Sheikh, whom a guaranteed succession or the necessity of finding
a substitute for the product (such as Sheikh Saqar of Abu Dhabi) of a bloodstained
succession may have left on our hands. And once the principle were accepted
of extending our protection beyond the limits of sea power or diplomacy, we should
run the sure and constant risk of becoming more and more involved both in the
internal management of the Sheikhdom and also in commitments inland. It is of
course possible that some if not all of the Sheikhs would today welcome (as the
Sheikh of Abu Dhabi doubtless would) a guarantee from us of complete protection.
But it does not follow that either Sheikh or tribesmen would welcome any other
interference on our part. On the contrary, as Colonel Haworth reminds us,
throughout the past “ the Sheikhs were as anxious to keep us out of their lands
as we were anxious to avoid being drawn into their quarrels on shore.” It does
not even follow that our interference would check the infiltration of Wahabi
influence. Indeed recent events in Bahrain, as recounted in the Political
Resident’s letter No 138-S., dated l/7th May 1927, suggest that the very progress
of British reforms and methods, so difficult to curb once started, may be tending to
make Bin Saud in the eyes of Sheikhs and tribesmen the champion of Arabia
and Arab methods for the Arabs.
4. Now in view of the strategical importance of an air-route along the Arab
shores of the Gulf and the possibility that it may indeed prove, owing to Persian
obstruction, the only practicable commercial route from Europe to India, we should
have little hesitation in endorsing Colonel Haworth’s proposal, in its essentials
at any rate, did we feel that a reversal of policy was really necessary for the success
ful establishment of the route. Over the actual acquisition, however, Of a suitable
chain of aerodromes, by lease or purchase, there does not appear from Colonel
Haworth’s reports to be a likelihood of any difficulties which the Resident’s personal
influence would not be able to overcome on a cash basis. And the same seems
true of the assured continuance of local good-will which would be one of the requi
sites for the security of aerodromes and air-route. For the rest, as Colonel Haworth
emphasises, our prestige in the Gulf stands high and our sea-power holds the coast
at its mercy. The proximity of the aerodromes to His Majesty’s ships would
in itself be a guarantee of security, while in times of trouble swift action from the
sea would ordinarily be ample to counter whatever threats we might be called
upon to meet. And though aeroplanes, aerodromes and air-routes all require pro
tection, they in turn would of themselves contribute much to the general security
once matters were in full swing.
5. There remains the danger of Wahabi encroachments on which Colonel
Haworth rightly lays stress. But so long as Bin Saud is the ruler of Nejd we are
justified by past history in relying for security against this danger on his Treaty
engagements to us. From this point of view the future would no doubt have
been more assured, had it proved possible to include Article 6 of the Treaty in its
original draft form. But even as it stands, it conveys to Bin Saud a clear intima
tion, solemnly accepted by him, of His Majesty’s Government’s special position
and interest in these Sheikhdoms. And this special position and interest would
be signally underlined by the establishment of British aerodromes in their limits.
What will happen to the Wahabi State on Bin Saud’s death and how the change
will react on Gulf politics, it is impossible to forecast. But there seems no reason
for us to make an immediate reversal of our Gulf policy in anticipation of a
state of affairs which may never arise. Should a state of affairs arise hereafter
which called for a more definite assertion by us of more definite rights in the Arab
littoral, such assertion could be made and enforced on the basis of our existing
political position and sea-power.
6. If then it is decided to establish an air-route along the Arab littoral we
believe it both possible and advisable to establish it without any alteration in our
old and well-tried Gulf policy. It is of course not unlikely that from the establish
ment of an air-route and especially a commercial air-route, there would in time
flow changes which might lead on to some such radical readjustment of policy
as Colonel Haworth visualises. It certainly seems likely enough that a Sheikh
in whose limits an aerodrome were actually situated would soon come to
regard its presence as an additional degree of assurance of British protection.