'Minutes memos despatches etc' [‎70r] (139/156)

member, had been framed with excellent intentions. It was designed to put an end to
the incessant friction and rivalry between the British and Russian Governments at
Tehran, and to give a better chance to an independent Persia. But I concur with
those two noble Lords who referred to that agreement that, though excellent in
intention, it was disfigured by great faults. I remember, almost on the first occasion
that I had the honour of addressing your Lordships, I occupied something like an
hour of your time in pointing out what in my judgment they were. And, whether
the agreement was good or bad, at any rate it had two unfortunate consequences. In
the first place, by dividing up the country into so-called " spheres of influence,” it
aroused the incurable suspicion of the Persian Government and the Persian people,
who saw in it an ill-concealed scheme of partition of their country between Russia
and ourselves. And, in the second place, the suspicions were to some extent justified
by the policy and action of Russia, who proceeded to act as though she were a dictator
in the northern parts of Persia included within her sphere.
Accordingly when the war broke out and we were bound in close alliance with
Russia the suspicion and ill-feeling which had been aroused by her action in Persia
was, perhaps not unnaturally, passed on to us. Persia was nominally neutral, but
her sympathies really lay in the earlier stages with the Central Powers. Her
sympathies and weakness were equally exploited bv the Persian Government of that
day. German agents moved hither and thither in Persia carrying their intrigues far
and wide, even up to the Afghan border. Turkish armies, seizing the opportunity,
crossed the western border and invaded large portions of Persian territory. Anarchy
and disorder prevailed in most parts of the country. The Tehran Government was
feeble and hostile. Persia might at any moment in these circumstances have become
an active and dangerous theatre of war. Simultaneously, if you will bear it in mind,
our forces were advancing in Mesopotamia to Baghdad, while on the other side of
Persia it was part of our duty to protect the Afghan border. We would not afford in
these circumstances to let Persia become a new theatre of war. The whole of our
policy was devoted to steadying the situation in Persia ; hence it was, as one noble
Lord mentioned, that we took over control of the South Persia Rifles from the
Swedish officers who had signally failed in their task, and endeavoured, with the
consent of the Persian Government, at least to secure that some measure of order
should prevail in the southern parts of the country.
After a while a new danger supervened. I allude to the period of the war when
the enemy forces were in the ascendant, and we were more than doubtful if the victory
would ultimately be ours. The Turks and the Germans both appeared in force in the
Caucasus. They occupied the entire belt of country from the Black Sea . to the
Caspian; they held Baku; they threatened the invasion of Central Asia; they
menaced Tehran. This was a danger to Mesopotamia, to North Persia, and to
Afghanistan. It was in these circumstances, after our occupation of Baghdad, that
the first military force under General Dunsterville was pushed forward from Bagh
dad on what is know as the Hamadan Road in the direction of Kazvin and the
Caspian. This was done in order to close the north-western border of Persia, which
at that time might have been broken open at any moment by a combined force of
Germans and Turks, or by either acting independently.
Simultaneously on the other side of Persia—on the north-eastern side—the
Government of India sent a mission accompanied by a small number of troops under
General Malleson to Meshed. They were to guard the north-eastern door, and, as
far as possible, to encourage the Turcomans in the resistance which they were offering
to the common enemy and to keep peace on the Persian border. It seems now to be
quite forgotten—I do not know whether it was realised at the time—that there was
a serious danger that the Germans and the Turks, either separately or in combina
tion, might cross the Caspian, seize the Trans-Caspian Railway, and advance right
to the borders of Afghanistan in the neighbourhood of Herat. It was for this object
that Colonel Malleson and his men remained for some time in that part of the world.
Down in the south of Persia the South Persian Rifles, to which I alluded just now,
were confronted with the danger of a formidable rising in the mountain country
between Shiraz and the sea. It was with no small difficulty that Sir Percy Sykes,
who commanded the force, was relieved, and for that purpose a rather large force
was sent, upon the advice of the Indian Government, to Bushire.
Such was the now almost forgotten sequence of events in Persia in the early and
troublous stages of the war. This policy of activity on our part, pursued as it was
with unwearying patience and with great ability by the various officers and forces
who represented us, was successful. The danger was overcome; the Turks and
Germans were thrown out of the Caucasus; Khorassan was preserved; the danger to