'Minutes memos despatches etc' [‎70v] (140/156)

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Afghanistan was removed; Persia was freed from her enemies. At this stage she
definitely realised what we had done for her and her attitude changed from doubtful
amity or open hostility to sincere friendliness. At that time there was in power in
Persia a Minister known as Vossug-ed-Dowleh, speaking with great experience and
authority for his countrymen. Simultaneously we sent out from Baghdad to Tehran
the most capable ofiicial with knowledge of the East whom we could supply. I allude
to Sir Percy Cox, now grappling, as I think and hope, successfully with our difficul
ties in Mesopotamia. Be it remembered it was by no means his first experience in
Persia. For something like twenty years his life had been spent in contact with
Persians in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . Upon his arrival in Tehran
the Minister Vossug-ed-Dowleh addressed overtures to us to enter into a friendly
agreement with the Government he represented.
I need not waste two minutes here in defending the proposition—because I am
sure no one will dispute it—that Persia is an important British interest. That has
been the policy of every British Cabinet for over a hundred years. It has been the
pfolicy that has been announced from this table over and over again by successive
Foreign Ministers—Lord Salisbury and Lord Lansdowne—and, in another place, by
Viscount Grey of Fallodon, then Sir Edward Grey. A peaceful Persia, a stable
Persia, a friendly Persia, and an independent Persia have been corner stones of
British policy. They were the basis of the Anglo-Persian Agreement which we now
commenced to negotiate with the Persian Government. One or two questions were
asked me about that agreement. It has been laid before Parliament and its general
terms are no doubt familiar to your Lordships. We made no attempt in that agree
ment to compromise the independence of Persia in the smallest degree. On the
contrary, we categorically and expressly realfirmed and guaranteed it. What we did
trv in the agreement to do was to provide Persia with the means and instruments by
which that independence could be secured. We offered to assist her in creating an
independent, national military force of her own, giving her expert military assistance
in the organisation of that army. We sought to purify her internal administration
and to give her a scheme of sound finance. We aimed at opening up communications
and developing the resources of the country. At the same time as we were concluding
the agreement we gave to Persia, as a sequel to it. a loan of 2,000,000/. guaranteed
upon the Customs and other revenues of the country, and we provided also for a
revision of her tarifi, certain to be very greatly to her advantage. That, in a sentence
or two, was the pith and substance of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, and I recall—
I do not think any of your Lordships will dispute it—that that agreement was
received with general interest and sympathy in this country.
There was no attempt to suggest anything in the nature of a British protectorate
over Persia. We never thought of going to the League of Nations to ask for a
mandate for Persia. We preferred to treat her as a friendly and independent State
in a position of equality with ourselves, and l remember very well that at the time
that distinguished gentleman whose views have been quoted to-night, the Aga
Khan—who has expressed himself in the newspapers in some doubt as to our present
Persian policy—told me that he regarded the Anglo-Persian Agreement as a model
of what such an agreement between a great European Power and an Eastern State
should be. It was said at the time that this agreement ought to be sent to the league
of Nations for its approval. We were under no obligation to do this, because the
agreement had been concluded before the Treaty of Peace had been ratified and before
the Council of the League of Nations was in concrete existence. Nevertheless, I was
entirely willing from the start to act upon article 18 of the Covenant of the League.
There was nothing we had cause either to be ashamed of or to conceal, and from the
start I pressed the Persian Government, and the Persian Foreign Minister in par
ticular, most earnestly to take early steps to submit the agreement to the Persian
Parliament in order to obtain that support of the popular elements in the country
to which one of the previous speakers referred as so necessary. If the Persian Parlia
ment rejected the agreement there would be no need to go to the League of Nations.
If, on the other hand, they accepted and ratified it, clearly it would go to the League
of Nations with redoubled strength.
Soon after the conclusion of the agreement the Shah came to England, and your
Lordships may recollect that he more than once gave expression to the most cordial
acceptance of the agreement. We then proceeded to take steps, at the instance of
the Persian Government, to put it into execution. A Military Commission, under
General Dickson, who was chosen by the Persian Government for the purpose, was
sent out to examine, along with Persian colleagues, the military situation in Persia,
and to prepare a scheme for the creation of the uniform Persian military force which