'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎10r] (24/386)

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repented, explicit assurances concerning the integrity and independence of
Persia. In a despatch, dated the 5th September 1834, Lord Palmerston had
placed on record that—“ The Governments
with regard to the affairs of Persia in the
same spirit, and are equally animated
by a sincere desire to maintain, not only the internal tranquillity, but also the
independence and integrity of Persia”. Count Nesselrode in despatches, dated
the 20th October 1838 and the 29th January 1839, reiterated these pledges on
behalf of his Government. Again in 1873 the continued existence of these
mutual assurances was referred to with satisfaction by Count de Brunnow, as
reported in a despatch by Lord Granville, dated the 10th July 1873. Finally,
on the 12th March 1888, M. de Giers intimated, through M. de Staal, to Lord
Salisbury that the Russian Government “ have no objection to placing a^ain
on record that their views on this point are in no way altered”. A commu
nication was accordingly made by Sir H. D. Wolff to the Shah, to the effect that
the engagements between Great Britain and Russia to respect and promote the
integrity and independence of the Persian kingdom had again been renewed
and confirmed. The recent action of the Russian Government had shown
however, only too clearly that, within the limits of a nominally still existing
integrity and independence, so many encroachments upon both these attributes
were possible, that by almost imperceptible degrees the latter had passed into
the realm of constitutional fiction.
In September 1899, Lord Curzon’s Government addressed the Secretary of
State in a despatch, which reviewed the entire position in Persia on*the
above lines, and discussed the various policies which appeared best calculated to
meet the existing situation and to combat the aims of Russia. Broadly it may
be said that three possible policies presented themselves for consideration.
The first may be described as one for the regeneration of Persia by An^lo-
Russian means; the second as one of independent British action accom
panied by retaliation should need arise;
British policy. Three possible lines. the third as one for the partition of Persia
into spheres of influence.
The two former had both been recently discussed by Her Majesty’s Minister
at Tehran. The conclusion arrived at by Sir Mortimer Durand was that
it was hopeless to expect that we might
come to terms with Russia and per-
Joint action with Russia.
suade her to join us in a policy of reform and development. With this view
Lord Curzon’s Government were in entire accord. The hopelessness of such a
policy was evident frem the conditions of the case. Russia is interested, not in
the reform of Persia, but in its decay. A Government which had extracted
from the Shah a pledge that, for a period of ten years, no railway concession in
Persia should be granted to any Power save to Russia obviously could not be
expected to join in any course of real reform or genuine improvement.
The second policy was that to which the British Minister inclined. Sir
Mortimer Durand had suggested that a declaration should be made to
the Russian Government, and communi
cated to the Shah’s Ministers, that any
Independent action.
Russian encroachments in Northern Peisia would provoke corresponding
measures for the protection of British interests in the South. It had been
objected to this proposal that such an engagement might impose upon the
British Government an unwelcome responsibility in Southern Persia at the
moment most opportune to Russia and least convenient to ourselves. Lord
Curzon admitted the force of this criticism. But he believed that it might be
met by introducing into the suggested intimation an elasticity sufficient to
leave Her Majesty’s Government free to act for the protection of British
interests in Southern Persia, not in a specified manner at a specified moment,
but in such manner and at such juncture as might commend itself to their
judgment. The value of the objection was weakened, moreover, by the
consideration that, did Russia take any such step in Northern Persia as was
contemplated, counter-action of some sort, with or without a previous intima