'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎10v] (25/386)

tion would mail probability be imposed upon Her Majesty s Government
vbil’e the knowledge that a Russian advance in the ISorth might be the signal
for a corresponding British movement in the South could haidly fail to
operate as a deterrent upon any premature activity on the part of Russia,
since she might thereby gravely jeopardise the realisation of her own dreams
of ultimate access to Southern Persia and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .
The policy which Lord Curzon’s Government were inclined to prefer was
11^ third namely, that of the partition of Persia into spheres of influence. The
proposed'line^of division was one from Khanikin on the Turkish frontier
through Kermanshah and Hamadan, Ispahan and Yezd, Kerman and
1 • + of influence Nasratabad, to the Afghan border. Such
Lotri Curzon’s views. a partition would to some extent be
assisted by geographical conditions, the great deserts of Central Persia
constituting a natural barrier between tbe North and South and roughly dividing
one from the other. In the West, however, there is no wilderness of
sand and no natural line of division is clearly indicated. While on the
extreme East, Seistan lies, not to the south, hut on the north side of the
great desert harrier. The terms of the agreement would obviously be a matter
for discussion. An understanding had been arrived at between Great Britain
and Russia in regard to certain interests in China. Either party had there
pledged itself not to seek for railway concessions in the rival sphere, on its own
account, or on behalf of others, and not to obstruct directly or indirectly
applications for such concessions supported by the other in that sphere. It
w as suggested that such an arrangement, if applif d to Persia, might extend
to mines, roads, and other industrial or economic concessions. Such an agree
ment would admittedly have no more than a partial effect, for it w’ould not
extend to diplomatic action. An engagement excluding the exercise of
political influence by either party on the opposite side of the line, was
unfortunately confronted with difficulties which appeared insuperable. It
would he out of the question to remove the British, representatives at Tehran,
at Tabriz, or at Meshed, while corresponding objections would no doubt be
felt bv the Russian Government. Even an arrangement of the more restricted
character indicated would he difficult of conclusion, and would he open to obvious
objections on either side. Russia was determined to make Seistan her own.
Could she he induced to surrender this ambition ? She was equally bent on
obtaining access to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . Could she be persuaded to cut herself off
from this goal? On our part there was the difficulty that the capital lay in
the suggested Russian sphere, which included also the two important centres
of Tabriz and Meshed on the west and on the east. Russia would be at liberty
to link up ail these places with her own railway system, and thus to bring to
hear an overwhelming pressure upon the Central Government at Tehran.
Further, it might be asked: could Russia be trusted to abide by her
engagement ? It was recognised that such an expectation could not confi
dently he entertained. On the other hand, even though in course of time
the agreement might he broken, it was yet likely to afford a valuable respite
from the ceaseless rivalry which must otherwise continue. The course then
which Lord Curzon advocated was that, in the first instance, an .attempt
should he made to come to an agreement such as has been indicated : failing
that, and failure seemed likely, resort should be had to the line of policy
favoured by Sir Mortimer Durand.
No reply was received to this despatch for some months. Two
communications which were made during the interval to the Persian Govern
ment are worthy of note. On the 2Cth March 1900 Her Majesty’s Charge
d’Affaires at Tehran was instructed to remind the Persian Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the written promise given by the Persian Government
on the 23rd October 1897, that the Customs of Southern Persia should never
he placed under foreign supervision and control, and to add that Her
Majesty’s Government must hold the Persian Government to the strict observ
ance of this engagement. Again, on the 4th April, Mr. Spring Rice was
authorised to recall to the Persian Government the promise of the late
Shall that Great Britain should have priority of right to build a Southern
Railway to Tehran; that if concessions were given to others in the North,