'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎57r] (118/386)

territory in Burma, we encounter the rival ambitions and expanding influence of France
whose aspirations do not fall short of the complete absorption of the kingdom of Siam. It is
far from improbable that within twenty, perhaps within twelve, years from the present
time, the metaphor employed will have been justified, and the Indian Empire, alono* the
en tTv ° f ^ fron , tier8 ’. wiIi be coterminous with the territories, and confronted
with the ambitions of Powers whose interests are on the whole inimical to its own. In such
tnTtn-IrTl ^ !? n ° lJ 6 dream °, f 38 the futUre wil1 show ’ we sha11 nofc be ab]e t0 “ove,
o stnke, to advance in any part of the world where French or Russian interests are involved,
ecause of the menace that will stand perpetually at our Indian doors. Of the strain upon
r/ 13 ' 11 ?* 3 ' 1 fi? n0t present speak : but would be altogether in excess of our means,
m! n f t ? ere T f preseut lhree ^ a P s : the still independent kingdom of Siam
on the east, the portion of whose territories lying nearest to the Indian frontier has been
guaianteed by a convention between Great Britain and France; on the north the upland wilds
of Tibet as yet impervious to alien intrusion ; and on the west the dominions of the Shah.
These are the sole remaining buffers that separate the Asiatic possessions of Great Britain
rom her European mala. It rests with British statesmanship to retain all three intact. But
‘ C ? I ' 6 mo f > t . 1 . mpo !' tai L t of their number if it knowingly concedes to Russia that
g location of her ambition in Ea,stem Persia, the consequences of which to the British
Empire it has been the object of this Minute to expose.
34. The events of 1901, during
Lord Lansdowne’s recapitulation of
British policy towards Persia.
which the view’s of Ilis Excellency the
Viceroy were thus brought prominently to
the notice of His Majesty’s Government,
4 . n ^ the Mar( l ul ‘ s of L ausdowne on 6th Janu-
a.y 190-, to address to the Persian Government a weighty and comprehensive
pronouncement, modelled on a draft submitted by His Excellency, explaining
the policy of His Majesty s Government in regard to the various questions
pending between Persia and Great Britain. A copy of this communication was
or warded by the Secretary of State for India to the Government of India with his
reply (dated lltli March 1902) to their despatch of 7th November 1901, as indicat
ing the position taken up by His Majesty’s Government. Lord Lansdowne’s
despatch,^ alter referring to the difficulty which would he experienced in
maintaining the former policy of preserving the independence and sovereignty of
the Shah in face of the danger of Persia falling under the complete domination
ot another lower, went on to recognise the superior interest of Russia in the
northern portion of the Shah’s dominions ; hut with regard to the south,
where the efforts of a century had built up for us a pre-eminent mercantile posi
tion, the following remarks were made: “ It cannot reasonably be supposed that
Great Britain would abandon a position attained by so many years of constant
ertort, or would acquiesce in the attempts on the part of other Powers to acquire
political predominance in the south of Persia. Although, therefore, His Majesty's
Government have no desire to obstruct in any way the efforts of Russia to
find a commercial entrance for her trade in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , or to oppose au
obstacle to the passage of her commerce from the north for export from Persian
ports, they could not admit that such commercial facilities should form the
pretext for the occupation by Russia of points possessing strategical importance
or tor the establishment of such ascendency in the south as she already enjoys
in the north. The Persian Government should, therefore, distinctly understand
and icai in mind that Great Britain could not consent to the acquisition by
Jluasia of a military or naval station in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , for the reason that
such a station must be regarded as a challenge to Great Britain, and a menace
to her Indian Empire. If the Persian Government were at any time to make
such a concession to Russia, it would be necessary for His Majesty’s Govern
ment to take, in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , such measures as they might consider
necessary for the protection of British interests. Nor, again, could His Majesty’s
Government acquiesce in the concession to Russia of any preferential political
rights or advantages, or any commercial monopoly or exclusive privilege in
the southern or south-eastern districts of Persia, including Seistan.” The
despatch went on to recall the promises given by the Persian Government
not to place the customs of Southern Persia under foreign control. Reference
was next made to the written promise given by the late Shah and confirmed
by his successor with regard to British rights, whenever railways are construct-
* Ct'/e paragraph si page 9 . south of 1 ersia, and the recent
declaration, in July* 1901, of Ilis Majesty’s
Government of the importance which they attach to Seistan remaining free
from the intrusion of foreign authority in any shape, was reoalled.