'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎57v] (119/386)

“ In all these matters,” the despatch concluded, “His Majesty s Govern
ment have consistently sought to maintain the continued national existence
and the territorial integrity of Persia, and to develop her resources. Iheir
policy in this respect is in strict accordance with the understanding arrived at
between Great Britain and Russia in 1834, which was reaffirmed by an
exchange of assurances in 1888, pledging the two Governments to respect and
promote the integrity and independence of Persia. So km? as the Persian
Government will work with us cordially, they will find IIis Majesty s Govern
ment ready to support them in the promotion and protection of what are, in
fact, common objects to the advantage of both countries alike. If, on the other
hand, in the face of our warnings, the Persian Government should elect to
encourage the advance of Russian political influence and intervention in
these regions in any of the forms indicated above, His Majesty s Government
would necessarily have to reconsider their policy ; and they would regard them
selves as justified in taking such measures as might appear to them best calcu
lated to protect the interests so endangered even though m the adoption ot
such measures it might no longer be possible to make the integrity and inde
pendence of Persia their first object as hitherto.” Later in the same year, the
Shah visited England and during a private interview Lord Lansdowne acted
on the suggestion* contained in Lord
9 vide end ©f paragraph 29, page 9. Curzon’s despatch of the 6th September
1900 of making a declaration to His Majesty in person regarding the cardinal
points of British policy in Persia. His Lordship explained that His Majesty s
Government adhered to their oft-repeated recognition of the independence of
Persia. But their snecial concern, he added, was with the southern part of
Persia and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and that they were determined, if occasion arose, to
put forth the whole of their strength to prevent encroachment by other powers
in those regions.
35. The pronouncements above cited were accompanied by deliberations as
Defence of British interests in Persia to the steps by which the policy
in the event of Russian aggression. effected. The question had originated m
certain correspondence between Sir A. Hardinge and the Marquess of
Lansdowne, had been minuted on by the Government departments concerned,
and subsequently formed the subject of a conference at the Poreign Office in
November 1902 at which were present members of the War and India Offices,
the Admiralty and the British Poreign Office.
The first question discussed was the following
“ What action, if any, should he taken in respect of Persia by Great
Britain, in the event of war between Great Britain and Russia—it being
assumed that in such a war Russia might have the support of Prance, but that
Great Britain could not count on that of any European Power. ,,
Sir W. Nicholson stated that the military forces available at the outset in
the contingency referred to would be three Army Corps, and that the necessary
reinforcements of the Indian army for the defence of India would practically
absorb the whole of this force. No troops would, therefore, be available for
operations in Persia. The attitude of Afghanistan was uncertain.^ Persia was
not in a position to offer any resistance to the use of her territory in the north
as a route for a Russian advance. The distance to be traversed and the difficult
nature of the intervening country rendered it unlikely that any effective attack
could be organised against the flank of the Russian advance by means of the
tribes round Mohammerah and in other parts of Southern Persia.
As regards naval considerations, Prince Louis of Battenberg stated that
no naval base or station was required in the Gulf, and that a Russian naval
station there would not be formidable unless fortified, and, above all, with its
communications by land fully established. He also stated that the Admiralty
view was fully set forth in the memorandum, dated 12th November 1902.
In these circumstances, it was held that, in the event of war, our action
in the direction of Persia should be limited to (1) the occupation of Seistan,
or to holding a force ready for the purpose within striking distance; (2) the
seizure and occupation by Indian troops of Bunder Abbas, with the adjoining