'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎56v] (117/386)

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Government as to our interests in that quarter forbid me to believe that they would acquiesce
in any such calamity. For my own part, if Persia were to hypothecate to Russia the revenues
of Seistan (a move which has recently been under contemplation, but which 1 should regard
as not less insulting to ourselves than would be to Russia the hypothecation of the revenues
of Meshed to Great Britain), or t> cede to Russia a commanding political position on that
section of the border, I should not hesitate to advise that the Persian Government be com
pelled to cancel the arrangement. Such a peril can, however, be more opportunely averted
by a plain declaration of our views and intentions in advance, than by threats or military
movements afterwards,
15. Should a Russian naval port be constructed in the Gulf and should a Russian fleet
(most likely in connection with the French) be called into existence in the Indian Ocean
it is impossible either for the protection of our trade or for the safe'y of our own shores, that
we c^uld remain content with the existing strength of the East India squadron. We should
have to place the ports en the eastern coasts of India in a state of more finished defence than
is at present the case. Our military and nayal responsibilities would be more than doubled
in that direction.
16. The question would next arise how far Russia would find it compatible with her
newly acquired political ascendency, that the main lines of telegraphic communication between
Great Britain and India should run through Persian territory or beneath the waters of the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . Even if she were ready to leave them intact, should we be prepared to acquiesce
in the control, at a time of emergency, of these lines by 9 , foreign and probably a hostile
power ?
17. It has been argued that, if Russia cannot in prudence be allowed apart at the south
eastern end of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , owing to its close proximity to Indian shores, and its patent
challenge to Indian interests, we need entertain no such scruples about a port nearer to the
upper end. As 1 have previously argued, a commercial port, as the terminus of a commercial
railway, may be rendered equally innocuous anywhere in the Gulf. But if it is to be a political
port, and the terminus of a political railway, then it is equally objectionable wherever it be
placed, and the mere geographical distance of a few hundred miles or one or two days’ steam
makes no diflerence in the si nation. Political control over Southern Persia can equally be
disseminated from lines terminal ing at Mohammerah, Bushire, Bunder Abbas, or Charbar.
Whichever be the naval base, the ships that lie there can equally menace Indian commerce,
Indian shirping, and Indian interests. Moreover, while at the near end of the Gulf, a
Russian railway to the sea would have the drawbacks already" mentioned of invading the
British sphere of interest in Seistan and Peisian Baluchistan, of destroying British iniluenoe
in those regions, ard of directly menacing the British-protected territories of the Khan of
Kalat—a Russian railway to the upper end, e.y., to Mohammerah on the Karun, would similarly
traverse a region (that inhabited by the Lur and Bakhtiari tribes) in which British influence
has hitherto remained uncontested, and where British enterprise has established an adventurous
and successful foothold, and would terminate in a port which is owned by an Arab Shickh
whose family has been uniformly friendly to the British power, and which commands the main
channel of the Shat-el-Arab or combined estuary of the Tigris and Euphrates. To concede
luch a position to Russia would place the approach to Baghdad within her power, and would
extinguish the influence of Great Britain in Turkish Arabia A term used by the British officials to describe the territory roughly corresponding to, but not coextensive with, modern-day Iraq under the control of the Ottoman Empire. .
18. The international aspect of the acquisition by Russia of a port at either end of the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. cannot be ignored. Such an incident could not possibly stand alone. Undeir
instructions from the Home Government, we have recently submitted to them plans for counter
action in such a contingency, involving the seizure of certain Persian islands or harbours, in
self protection and retaliation, by ourselves. But neither would the action be confined to
Russia and Great Britain. France and Germany would unquestionably appear upon the scene.
The disastrous contagl n of Kiao-chow would le repr< duced ; and the Persian Gulf—for
hundred years, so far as political predominance is concerned, a British lake—would become a
second Gulf of Penhili, to be quarrelled over and parcelled out by the greed of rival Powers.
'I bis is no fanciful picture of the imagination. It is an indisputable deduction from the
circumstances of the case.
19. Finally, let me contemplate the effect that would be produced by the concession of
a Poisian lailway and a Persian port to Russia npon the general problem of Indian defence,
A glance at the map will show that India would then he surrounded in a ring fence by Russia
and her ally. Following this line from West to East I have already shown the position, at
A\hkh Russia aims, as threatening the entire western borders of Baluchistan and Afghanistan
from the Peisian Gulf to H*rat. Herat itself could be taken by the Russians in less than
three weeks, from Herat to the Oxug, the Afghan frontier is at the mercy of the Russian
101 ces. Ihe course oi the Oxus from Char jui to the Pamirs is now under their control. They
can cioss it at any point at any time without our knowledge and without the possibility of
ini on option. A) e are obliged even now to keep a close wateh upon the northern passes of
m 11 1 i: ast ^h® I’amirs, the Russians have already taken up a position in
t ie lagndmn bash-Pamir, which will presently make their Iron tier adjacent to our own
ou t e ustagh Range, Ihe fall of Kashgar and Chinese Turkistan is absolutely certain
and cannot very much longer be delay ed. Tibet will still intervene between Russian territory
an oui own in the north ; hut already rumours of a Russian Protectorate have Ken heard,
uul amission Hum Lhasa has been received by the Tsar. On the extreme east of British