'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎59v] (123/386)

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wider policy which we have credited her with holding in view. The despatch
continued as follows : —
“If Russia were to make any one of the forward movements culminating in the occu
pation of Persian territory, that we have described, we think that Great Britain should at once
retaliate by a corresponding 1 movement along the frontiers accessible to her forces by land or
sea. This movement would not be in the n at a re ot a hostile advance, or an invasion of the
country, or a permanent occupation of foreign soil. We should enter Persia because we claim
an absolute euudity of interest in that country with Russia, and with a view, by discussion to
re-establish the equilibrium, which by her initial action she would have violently disturbed.
We should enter as the supporters of the dynasty, in order to ensure a return to the status quo
ante, and to save those parts of the country lying nearest to our borders or in which our
interests are paramount, from the risks of disorder that could hardly fail to be aroused by the
news of an undisputed occupation by a foreign Power, and that would equally affect the
security of Persian interests and our own. Above all, although this may sound paradoxical,
we should enter in order to accehrate, under proper conditions, evacuation by the Russians as
well as ourselves. Th* places at which suah actions are open to us are, broadly speaking, four in
number,—namely, Seistan, Bunder Abbas, Bushire, and Mohammerah. Of these an alvance
on Seistan, or the occupation of Bunder Abbas and the adjacent islands, or the two in com
bination, would undoubtedly produce the greatest impression upon Russia, since if persisted in
they would cut right across the lines of her Asiatic policy and would imperil the attainment of
her ultimate ends. The occupation of Mohunmerah would probably produce a greater moral
effect upon the Persians from its greater proximity to the capital, more especially if it were
accompanied or followed by the threat of a movement upon Ispahan. On the whole, as it
would be more important at such a juncture to influence Russia than to frighten Persia, we
should recommend toe first in preference to the second plan of action. If Russia were te
advance upon Tabriz or Meshed (or a fortiori upon Tehran), we would at once push forward
a force to Seistan, and we would move the fleet t) Bunder Abbas. The occupation of that
port and of the adjacent islands is merely a question of running up a flag, which would be
eagerly welcomed by the inhabitants, who are not Persians, but Arabs. The general principle
to be observed, according to our view, w r ould be that for every movement made by Russia a
corresponding movement should be mule by ourselves, but that each movement should be
ace unpanied by an invitation to open a discussion with a view to the resumption of the status
quo.”
What would be the probable consequences of onr action ? The ulterior
objects of Russian policy iu Persia are three in number : (1) to reach the Persian
Gulf, (2) to acquire such control over Persia as to convert it into an exclusively
Russian market, (3) by means of (1) to be in a position to apply pressure on
the flank of Great Britain. The occupation by British forces of Seiitan and of
the mouth of the Gulf would be a serious, if not an insuperable, barrier to the
realisation of tbes; ambitions, and would before long bring home to the Russian
Government the advantages of an early discussion and settlement with ourselves.
There was, however, one aspect of the case upon which the Government of
India laid the greatest stress. The surest, indeed the only, preventive of such
action on the part of Russia was that she should know in advance what would
be the consequences of her action. The first condition of the policy thus recom
mended was that, not only the Persian Government but the Russian Govern
ment sh mid be clearly informed of the action that our reiterated pledges to
uphold the integrity of Persia would ompel us, in certain contingencies, to
take. Lord Curzon’s Government even thought that the knowledge that Great
Britain was thus prepared to resist the destruction of the independence of Persia
might predispose the Russians to enter upon a discussion with us as to the sole
means, apart from artificial resorts, by which that independence would be
permanently maintained, namely, financial and administrative reform.
<£ We now pass to an examination of the wider issue that would be raised by an invasion
in force of the whole of Xortaern Persia by the Russian arms. In such a case we think that
our r^ply is equally clear. We would retaliate by the occupation of Seistan and of the poit
and islands or Bunder Abbas We would land a British force at Bushire for the protection
of British interests and t ie support of a constituted authority there. We would do the same
at M> ham merah in sippox-t of the authority of the Sheikh, who, there can belittle doubt,
would welcome our appearance. In all these places we would explain that we came to save
the country fr »rn disruption ani to vindicate the existing order. At Mohammerah it would
lef h* consideration woe:her our commercial or political interests on the Karuu river required
tno despatch of British troops to Ahwaz or Shuster, We would, however, most certainly not
lea\e out of sight this most valuable corner of the Persian dominion!?, both because of its
intrinsic importance, because of the known sympathies of its Chiefs and people with the British
cause, and because, if we leave the field open, others will not fail to enter it.”
There remained the question raised by Sir A. Hardinge, whether the
occupation of Mohammerah and the Karun river should be followed by a
iniiitarv a d'ance upon Ispahan. The answer to this question seemed to depend
upon two contingencies, on neither of which was it possible to pronounce with