'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎60r] (124/386)

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any exactitude at the time. Given a strong Governor at Ispahan, and the
existence of conditions in which our presence would be welcomed by the
people, the Government of India thought that an invitation to send a contin
gent to that place might he deserving of consideration.
But the further contingency, upon which the answer to the question was
even more dependent, was the degree of confidence that we might repose in,
and the extent of assistance that we might hope to receive from, the tribes
occupying the belt of country to the west and north-west of Ispahan. If the
Bakhtiaris, Lurs and other tribes in that neighbourhood had in the interim
composed their internecine feuds, if we had been able, by means of levies or
road guards upon the Bakhtiari and Luristan roads, to acquaint the picked men
of the tribes with military drill and discipline, if they were found to possess
stamina and courage, and if we could rely upon their loyalty, then the Govern
ment of India thought that a forward move upon Ispahan might be an even
more advantageous venture, and that a Russian advance in that quarter would
be exposed to a flank attack that she might not care to encounter. The intro
duction of some sort of military organisation among the tribes alone would
supply experience as to whether they possessed fighting capacity or the cap
ability of common action in defence of their country. For the present it could
only be said that the idea of a forward move upon Ispahan, as part of the
general strategical plan, was one that in the opinion of the Government of
India ought not to be lightly or hastily condemned. Its execution, however,
must depend upon conditions which were at the moment of too hypothetical
a nature to ]ustify their being treated as the basis of a confident forecast. It
must also depend upon the nature and numbers of the Russian advance, since
the Government of India were alive to the danger of sending British or Indian
troops to an advanced position where they might be in danger of being isolated,
and where it would be diflicult, if not impossible, to support them.
39. No reply was received to this despatch, but it became known early in
Views of Imperial Defense Committee, tliat tlie question of British policy
March 1905 . in Persia had been referred for the con
sideration of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The conclusions formulated
at a meeting held on the 22nd March 1905 were as follows : —
(1) It is essential to maintain, and, if possible, to increase our in
fluence at Tehran, in order that we may be able to control railway
construction in Persia, which is by far the most important factor
of the strategic situation.
(2) It should he our object, on commercial as well as on strategic
grounds, to maintain the status quo in Persia.
(3) It is essential to maintain our existing claims on the coast of the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. without aggression or ostentation.
(4) Financial assistance may be inevitable in certain cases, but is not
desirable in principle. Each case should be considered on its
merits.
These conclusions, though communicated privately to Lord Curzon, were
not imparted to the Government of India in any official manner.
40. In June of the same year, Sir Arthur Hardinge forwarded to the Gov
ernment of India a copy of a despatch in which there was a reference to certain
overtures which had been made (with a view to putting an end to the chronic
diplomatic contests at Tehran) by the British Foreign Office to the Russian
Government for the partition of Persia into spheres of influence, hut which had
been declined. The Minister, while of opinion that Russia would never consent
to a permanent Anglo-Russian arrangement which would be fair to British
interests, was of opinion that she might agree to an armistice after the model
of the Russo-Austrian understanding as to the Balkans, and thus by joint action
postpone the crisis towards w 7 hich the affairs of Persia seemed to tend.
41. On receipt of this communication, Lord Curzon again determined to
address His Majesty’s Government. Nothing, he explained, had occurred to
cause the Government of India to alter the views regarding the proposed
partition of Persia expressed in their despatch of September 1899, and he