'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎135v] (275/386)

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No. 71 (Secret— External), dated Fort William, the 24-th March 1904.
From— The Government of India in the Foreign Department,
To The Right Hon’ble St. John Brodrick, His Majesty’s Secretary of State for
India.
In our despatch No. 16 (Secret—External), dated 21st January 1004, we
mentioned that we should address you later regarding the features and
potentialities of the various Khors, or maritime inlets, at the northern end
of the Gulf, to which it seems likely that trans-Turkish or trans-Persian
• No. 25 (Secret—External), dated 4th Feb« hailuaYS may 1)6 taken at some future
ruaryuot. date. In our letter* of the 4th February
we discussed the question of the Khor Abdulla, which lies at the head of the
Gulf on its Turkish side. We now propose to deal with the Khor Musa, situated
on the Persian coast.
2. Though the existence of this waterway is shown on the charts and
maps of this part of the Gulf, it had never, so far as we are aware, been brought
to notice, until attention was invited to it by Commanders Kemp and
. T Somerville in a recent report, which
the 2 Otli J une 1903* • •«• u. ~t 7 ~ \ \ % • j 4 . i
indicated that Khor Mussa provides the
best, if not indeed the only, defensible naval position on the Persian coast, west
of the Straits of Hormuz. During his recent tour the Viceroy, in company with
the Commander-in-Chief on the East Indies Station, took the opportunity to
visit this channel. The naval aspect of the case is fully dealt with in the
report of June last; and we have since obtained from Major Burton, Officiating
Vice*Consul at M oh a mm e rah, a communication, of which we enclose a copy,
describing the land approaches to the creek. The map, which accompanies this
despatch, shows approximately the topography as determined by the chart and
Major Burton’s route sketch. A good road could probably he made from Ram
Hormuz on the Bakhtiari route to Mashur, whence communications exist to
Nasiri (Ahwaz) and Mohammerah. The distance from Ram Hormuz to Mashur
is 59| as against 72 miles to Ahwaz on the Karun. From the Khor Bukhadir,
or western branch of the Khor Musa, a dire3t route to Mohammerah is
apparently feasible across the high land. Between Mashur and the anchorage
at the mouth of the Khor Dorah, it seems likely that the construction of a per
manent road would be a work of greater difficulty, though water carriage is at
any rate possible.
3. The capabilities of the position appear to us to be considerable. In
a recent memorandum by the Admiralty, discussing the prospects of the
establishment of a Russian base in the Gulf, it was stated that the port had yet
to be found which would suit the purposes of that Power, and reference was
made to the lack of local supplies of coal or other fuel as likely to minimise the
value of any foreign naval station in these waters. Assuming an attempt by
Russia to acquire a maritime post towards the upper end of the Gulf, we think
that her attention might not improbably be called to Khor Musa. She might
find here that outlet to the sea for a railway descending from the high lands in
the interior of Persia which is understood to be one of the objects of her
ambition, and a harbour so constructed would certainly be well sheltered from
marine attack. No doubt these advantages would he largely neutralised by a
British occupation, as already recommended by us, of the Hormuz-Kishm
position at the entrance to the Gulf; and one of our main reasons for so
strongly insisting upon the importance of that position is the effect that we
should thereby be able to exercise upon the movements of a Power seeking an
interior rather than an exterior base in Persian waters.
4. It is also conceivable that in certain conditions Khor Musa might he
useful to ourselves. Should it be thought necessary at any time to occupy
or support Mohammerah, and should the ascent of the Shat-el-Arab for any
reasons he found inconvenient, a base for advance might be found here, the
strategic value of which would be enhanced by the proximity of the mountain
country of the Lur and Bakhtiari tribes, to which we have always looked to