'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎138v] (281/386)

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from placing them in commission under the control of the Admiralty. In this
connection it is perhaps not irrelevant to quote a passage from Lord Brassey s
Naval Annual for 190* (pages 440-441), where the editor writes—“ The Indian
Government should be encouraged to strengthen their local navy . . . it
would give sensible relief to the Imperal Navy if some portion of the trying
duties on the coasts of Burma and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. were to be handed over to
the Indian Marine.” We propose no change so drastic as this ; we merely desire
that the existing vessels of the Marine shall be used to the best advantage; but
w e think that the above opinion expressed by so high an authority as Lord
Brassey supports our view that the Admiralty’s objections to these vessels being
armed for particular services are not insupciable.
5. If a ship of the Loyal Indian Marine is armed, we understand that the
rules of international law render it necessary that her combatant status should
be indicated (1) by her flag, and (2) by the commissions of her officers.
Assuming that the flag of the Royal Indian Marine is to be regarded as the flag
of a non-combatant service, we suggest that when a ship oi. that sendee is
armed she may be authorised by the Admiralty to fly such special flag as may
be appointed, or to make use of an ensign indicating her status as one of His
Majesty’s armed ships. In regard to the commissions of her officers, we would
refer to the rule under which temporary commissions are granted to officers
of the Royal Indian Marine when they are posted to ships of the Defence Squad
ron, and we suggest that temporary commissions may iu like manner.be granted
to the officers of any armed ship serving under the orders ©f the Admiral, If the
Lords of the Admiralty are able to concede these two points, wg trust that tho
arguments contained in the preceding paragraphs will remove all objections to
the course which we advocate.
6. In bis evidence before the Royal Commission Sir John Ilext with
considerable justice referred to the preamble of the Indian Marine Service Act of
1884 iu support of his contention that the vessels of the Marine ought to be
armed. The clause in question describes the duties of these vessels as being
“the transport of troops, the guarding of convict settlements, the suppression of
piracy,” etc., and it has been urged more than once that these duties could not
be carried out by unarmed vessels. We do not think it necessary to assert that
India has a legal right under the Marine Service Act to put armaments on board
the ships of the Marine, although the existence in the Act of the words quoted
seems to give some support to our contention.
7. Finally, there is the question whether any difficulty w r ould arise in com
bining the use of the Marine ship in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. as an armed vessel with
the duties which she already performs. In this respect we do not anticipate any
trouble. The duties of despatch vessel for the Resident, which is the principal
work of the are even now performed by H M.S. Sphinx whenever
tbe Lawrence goes to Bombay to be docked; indeed the Resident uses either
one or the other vessel indifferently, and the addition of an armament to the
Lawrence, thus rendering her available to supplement the Sphinx or other
Royal Navy ship in case of need, would not in our opinion in any way interfere
with her work as a despatch boat. As to her suitability for use in the Gulf as
an armed vessel there can be no question, for she is a sister ship of the Sphinx,
w hich was described by Admiral Kennedy before the Royal Commission of 189(5
as “ a perfect ship for the Gulf,” while the same authority declared that the
Lawrence was “just as good as the Sphinx, perhaps better,” We arrive there
fore at tbe facts that we have in tbe Lawrence a vessel excellently suited for
armed police work in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , but that we are deprived of her services
for such a purpose by the orders prohibiting her from being armed ; and we
have brought forward arguments to prove that that prohibition may be with
drawn without danger or inconvenience. We shall now endeavour to show
that w 7 e have good reason for advocating this course.
8. As far back as 1892 we forwarded with despatch No. 11, dated 26th
October of that year, a letter from the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran.
urging the importance of putting an armament on board the Lawrence so as to
admit of that vessel being used as a combatant if so required. Lord Kimberley
did not, however, accept our view of the matter, and the armament which