'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎140r] (284/386)

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(ii) The continuation of the existing arrangements by which Imperial
and police duties would be carried out by the ships of the Koyal
Navy, assisted from time to time by particular Koval Indian
Marine vessels armed for special duties. The command of all
armed vessels would in these circumstances remain with the Naval
Commander-in-Chief in peace and war.
9. The scheme suggested by the Admiralty may be credited with the
following advantages:—the administrative convenience resulting from the more
direct control of a naval force in Indian waters; the eventual formation of a
bodv of officers who would be intimately acquainted with the inhabitants and
languages of the littoral, and with local conditions ; and the improvement of
the°status of the Royal Indian Marine in consequence of the prestige attaching
to a combatant service. It is, further, possible that a few officers and men of
the Royal Navy might be released from local employment for more important
duties with battle squadrons.
But, as we shall endeavour to show in detail, the serious political, financial
and administrative disadvantages which the proposed measure possesses are, in
our opinion, such as to preclude its acceptance.
10. Even if we regard the Admiralty proposal from the point of view of our
political interests in the Bersian Gulf alone, the scheme must in our opinion
stand condemned, because of the serious reduction of our prestige that could not
fail to result. So long as the Gulf was practically an Indian lake, and the duty
of our ships was confined to the coercion of the oriental inhabitants of the
Persian and Arabian coasts, our interests could safely be entrusted to the ships
of the Indian Navy. The advent of French men*of-war in greater numbers,
and the placing of the slave trade under the Frenchand Spanish flag, were the
chief causes of the. substitution of the Imperial Navy for the local service in
1862. Now that not only France hut Russia, Germany, and Turkey are display
ing an increasing interest in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , and that the influence of Great
Britain is being directly and increasingly challenged by other nations whose
policy and ambitions can ho open to no misinterpretation, it is essential that we
should he strongly represented by ships possessing the high prestige of His
Majesty’s Navy in waters which possess an Imperial importance in connection
with the Middle Eastern problem. It w^ould he disastrous to revert to our
former system of control in these seas, for no act of legislation could confer on
the Royal Indian Marine the same international status as is enjoyed by the
Royal Navy. This objection would apply with even greater force to any
proposal for the utilisation of an armed squadron of the Royal Indian Marine
in more frequented Eastern Maters.
Again with the Royal Nauy as our naval agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. , we can count upon a
superior type of officer to that which wu should secure undei^ an expanded
Royal Indian Marine. The absence of local knowledge or experience has not
been attended by any of the results that sometimes occur in countries, where
Europeans are brought into contact for the first time with oriental peoples or
customs. On the contrary, the naval officers, who have been called upon to
perform what are sometimes very delicate duties, appear to have displaced a
uniform and remarkable mixture of firmness and tact. It will he icmembeie
that in connection with the arming of the Lawrence your predecessor expressed
some doubt regarding the capacity of Royal Indian Marine officers,^even w hen
serving under the immediate command ot officers of His Majesty s Navy, o
deal satisfactorily with international questions.
11. Socondlv, the resuscitation of an Indian Navy, in however modified a
form, would entail additional expenditure from our revenues, which would not
only be considerable in the initial stages, hut w’ould also tend to increase.
We have not attempted to estimate the extra cost of a local service. It is
perhaps sufficient to recall the fact that whereas, previous to its abolition, more
than £300,000 was spent yearly on the Indian Navy, our present contribution
to the Admiralty amounts to less than £120,OcO. It is, however, patent t at,
in our circumstances, a local navy, of whatever size, must he by lar the tjamm
expensive arrangement. The Admiralty are able to provide the ships and ma one
required for local duties more cheaply than we are in a position to do, anc are
able to dispose of them to better advantage when their period ot utility has