Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎14v] (28/290)

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few hours by the Bolshevik fleet. Our position on shore necessitated
the presence of a fleet in the Caspian to protect the end of the
Batum-Baku line. If the ships were not there the Bolsheviks could
land behind us to the south of the line.
General Radcliffe said that was also the view of the military
authorities.
Captain Aylmer said that the submarine menace was not a
serious one, because of the shallow depth of the Caspian near
Astrakan. In these waters the submarines could only act as very
inferior torpedo-boats. There was, however, deep water at Kras-
novodsk, which would enable them to operate if they got there.
He thought that at present we were competent to defeat the
Bolshevik fleet at Astrakan, but the danger in the situation was that,
if we had been slightly maided in such an encounter, and on coming
back had to meet a fresh Bolshevik fleet coming from Baku, the
situation might be serious. The position, however, was being dealt
with. General Erderley, on General Denikin’s orders, was paying
the crews off, and, failing that, the ships were to be captured or
sunk. The fact that these ships were being demobilised, under a
mandate from General Denikin would preserve this action from being
regarded as due to an English order.
In his opinion, the ships would be handed over, and it would not
be necessary to sink or capture them. When the crews had been
disbanded we could, if required, man the fleet. We had in the
Caspian 360 British sailors. No collision with the forces at Astrakan
was likely to take place until the middle of March, when the ice
might be expected to break.
Petrovsk was a refitting base. It was important to hold it
because it was handy to the Bolshevik base, which was situated at a
place 60 miles north-west of Chechen.’
(Captain Aylmer withdrew.)
\
Professor Simpson drew the attention of the Conference to a
telegram from “ Astoria,” Paris (No. 275, dated 11th February, 1919)
which referred to a possible danger of General Denikin using his
forces against the Georgians, and asked “ that a telegram be sent by
the War Office conveying an intimation to General Denikin that in
no circumstances must arms supplied by the Allies be used to force
Georgia back into a reconstituted Russian Empire, and that any
operations directed by him against the Georgians would lead to the
immediate withdrawal of British support.” He said the telegram
appeared to him of considerable importance in view of the matter
under discussion. General Denikin seemed to be pursuing the policy
which, since October last, we had foreseen he might adopt.
General Radcliffe said that the root of the trouble was that
General Denikin had always regarded with suspicion and dismay any
idea of these provinces being cut away from the old Russian Empire.
A telegram in the sense indicated had been sent by the War Office
to General Denikin two days ago.
The Chairman said it seemed that we had gone into Russian
Armenia, we had recovered a portion of the province of Kars, we had
set up a civil administration with British officials, and we had given
a financial guarantee—which was exactly what we had not wanted
to do. He was anxious to settle our policy. Three courses seemed
open. The first was to wait for General Milne’s report. Milne had
provided the Conference with a very fair summing-up in the case of
Trans-Caspia, and his report on the Caucasus might prove equally
valuable. The second course was to define now r , as precisely as
possible, our task, both military and civil, in Caucasia. The third
course, which might be either alternative to, or coincident with the
second, was to send out somebody in authority to find out and report
on what was going on.