Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎15r] (29/290)

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Mr. Montagu said he did not think there was time to send
anyone out to the Caucasus. His own view was that we would have
to withdraw from the Caucasus, but the evidence at present available
was insufficient to enable us to come to a decision. He therefore
suggested that a telegram should be sent to General Milne to say
that in Paris and London discussions on the future of the Caucasus
were going on, but the question would not be decided until alter the
receipt of his report. In the meantime he should confine military
operations to the policy of the first alternative in the note of the
General Staff. (Paragraph 6 (a) of note. See Appendix.)
General Radcliffe said an estimate would be required from
General Milne of how many men he would want for this limited
policy.
Mr. Montagu said that our policy in the Caucasus would be
roughly analogous to the position in the Khyber Pass So long as
order was maintained on our own side, we would not interfere in
inter-tribal quarrels on the other.
The Chairman agreed, but said, unfortunately, the “ tribes ” in
the present case were more or less educated groups, to whom we had
shown our sympathy.
Mr. Kidston said that even now wires were coming in almost
daily complaining of the murder and rapine that was going on, and
asking for our help.
Professor Simpson said it was the Turks who had set these
people by the ears, and once the Turks had been cleared out things
ought to be quieter. Neither the Armenians nor the Georgians
wanted too close handling. They were all out for independence, and
the Georgians, in particular, wished neither the Russians nor
ourselves.
The Chairman suggested that a telegram to General Milne
should be drafted by the War Office and reviewed in its political
aspect by Mr. Montagu and himself. The telegram should be on the
lines suggested by Mr. Montagu. It should outline our policy, as
stated in paragraph 6 (a) of the General Staff note on Trans-Caucasia,
and it should state quite clearly that, pending our withdrawal, the
essential interim policy must be as follows : —
To hold the three principal cities on the railway line—Batum,
Tiflis, and Baku.
To hold the Caspian.
Not to extend our military operations far afield, or to get
involved either in administrative or military responsibilities.
To avoid commitments in excess of our policy.
Lastly, General Milne should be asked to state how many
troops he required to carry out this policy, and what
orders he proposed to issue. .
Mr. Montagu suggested that the telegram should state “ we
want no commitments of military or financial assistance to any local
government.”
The Chairman suggested, as a further addition to the telegram,
that General Milne should be asked to select an able intelligence
officer with the greatest possible local knowledge of the Caucasus,
and to send him to London as early as possible to advise upon the
situation.
The Conference decided —
That the War Office should be asked to draft a telegram in the
above sense to General Milne, and that, before being sent,
the telegram should be reviewed in its political aspect by
the Secretary of State for India and the Chairman.
(Initialled) C. of K.
Foreign Office,
February 13, 1919.
[987]—224
D