‘Seistan Persia & Seistan’ [‎156v] (321/617)

The Shah’s sons.
Consequent evils.
Revenues derived
from various offices,
and consequent
interest in existing
conditions.
Evils partly caused
by character of
nation.
be met by starving the public Departments,
demands for money can only be mer y The Heir-Apparent is a man of weak
ButtheShahisnottheonlyoneinfa b H. n ^ to be dang erously
character, and allows u no f Xwinff dTsorder to spread in the south, if he
“feruled. _ The .f' 1 ;f ^ n" g o ezcitelt ^ The Shah’s third and favourite son,
not joining with the Mullas to e , -.--c
The Sadr-i-Azam.
His centralization of
functions.
misruled. The Zil-es-Sultan
is not joining with the Mullas to excne n, , Commander-in-chief, enriches
the Naib-us-Sultaneh, who whom he neglects and robs. The Sadr-i-
himself at the expense of the troop i 1 o,n whol(j work of the
a rvcn-n ions ora,dually drawn into 1-> t .. rrv,^ii /iinirnr ond
Though clever and
numerous enemies,
Relations with
foreign Powers.
Persia’s tendencies to
encroach.
Neglect of British
representations.
Her fear of Russia.
Azam has gradually drawn ^ ^ discharffe
Government offices, which he I | 1 lr f ble , t ? d , 1 S l'X his
Zt^ettoSnddi^hod nianner.t Moreover, the centralization of powers
in the hands of the Sadr-i-Azam has led to another evil. Having everj thing in
his own control, he draws from various sources an income generally estimated at
something between 70,0G0Z. and 100,000/. a-year; and the removal of anj
administrative abuse would almost inevitably deprive him of a portion of this
sum. The Sadr-i-Azam declares that the profits of his various offices go ^.o his
relatives and subordinates, not to himself; but this, if true, seems to mate
little practical difference. I am afraid the Sadr-i-Azam can only be regarded
as himself a serious obstacle to all reform. Finally, it must t>e pointed out that
the failings of the men now in power are not solely responsible for the piesent
state of the country. The Administration is, and lias been foi geneiations,
corrupt right through. The first idea of every Persian official is illicit gain. Ho
doubt the proceedings of the Shah and others who ought to set an example
tend, to increase the prevailing corruption, but they have not created it. Its
roots lie deep in the national character. Of all the Asiatics with whom I have
had to deal, the Persians appear to me to he the most shameless liars and
thieves.! And there is no patriotism upon which one can work. Patriotism
is replaced here by national conceit, "which makes the Persians look down with
contempt upon all other countries, but will not make them sacrifice the smallest
personal interest for the good of their own.
Altogether it cannot he denied that the internal condition of Persia is far
from promising.
4. The outlook with regard to her relations with foreign Powers is, from
our point of view, not much more satisfactory. Though so feeble as to be at
the mercy of almost any assailant, Persia is inclined to adopt towards all Powders
hut one an aggressive and peremptory tone. She encroaches steadily on the
frontiers of Kelat, Afghanistan, and Turkey, and her reliance on the good
nature of England is so complete that she frequently permits herself to treat
our representations with neglect, and even at times with a careless levity
amounting to contempt.
Towards Russia, on the other hand, her attitude is one of respect and fear. *
* The Shah s methods of collecting money from private individuals are numerous, and at times
amusing. Before we left Tehran last May I used to meet him driving about on a round of visits
7/tH • W i he honoured 111 tllis "-ay had to produce a “ pishkesli ” of from 50/. to 200/.
If His Majesty makes a good shot at a moufflon, as he often does, those about him at once subscribe
a purse of gold pieces as a token of their admiration. He is fond of playing chess in the afternoon
ifwrl U h f ee SamC - His .°PP oneilt always loses, and His Majesty pockets the gold.
It is said that not long ago lie was caught m a snowstorm when out shooting. He found shelter in
a hut on the hih-side, and before leaving it he asked what “ pishkesh ” the owner meant to offer for
man pr ° dUCed ^ RuSSian im P erials ( some thing under 5/.),
t Phe Sadr-i-Azam’s office is a black leather hand-bag, into which he tlirus f s his IpHovq
te egrams as he receives them. Every one addresses him direct on every conceivable subieff so the
hag is always bulging with papers ; and at any spare moment he takes out S ° ^
on them. Once a paper leaves this bag it is forgotten, atid verv likely lost J f
act as Ins Secretaries are incompetent to a degree that cannot he described Yet thev nroJ W n°
transact ali the important correspondence of the Persian Government.—H. M D 3 piactlcall y
1 . Sadr-i-Azam tells me he has lately found out that the Minister of Posts srm of u t> •
dent of the Conned, personally steals from the post-office parcels whieffi he heheves tn hl -V m' 1 '
re Sadi-i-Azam can do nothing, because the President of the Council only ffiuohs t J aluabl e-
proceedings, and is too strong to be attacked. As to untruthfulness I have Lrdl g ^ S ° n 8
one Persian statesman about another without bein- warned tHt I must 1 ^ eVer s P oke11 to
other says.—H. M. D. ° l t 1 must never believe a word the