‘Seistan Persia & Seistan’ [‎158r] (324/617)

P oss .^^ e we might come to a friendly understanding with her
and that we might enter with her upon joint action for the reorganization and
+w Ve i 3 n ^ en ^ coun try. Such a scheme is very attractive. At present
el eisian Government plays off Russia and England against each other, with
the result that neither can do much, and that Persia remains misruled and
undeveloped. If once England and Russia fairly came together, we might divide
Asia between us, and we could do anything we liked in Persia without the
the smallest difficulty. A joint demand for the necessary reforms would be
irresistible, and there would probably be no attempt at resisting it. A
guaranteed loan, sufficient to permit of the reorganization of the finances and
the construction or certain public works could be easily raised, and we could
then proceed to open out the country by land and water communications, to
extend the area of cultivation, to increase the revenue, and to create a con
siderable trade. The country has so many natural advantages, and is in many
ways so well off even now, that much detailed interference with the administration
would not be required. A little steady pressure on certain main lines by the
English and Russian Legations acting together would make Persia in a very
few years a solvent, flourishing country, and in course of time it should become
a comparatively rich oneA Both England and Russia would gain largely from
a commercial point of view | put the question is whether Russia would ever fall
in w T ith such a scheme, and whether, if so, we could hope to carry it out without
disagreement and ultimate trouble. This seems to me unlikely. It is possible
that the proposal, if made by us, might be accepted by Russia, especially if it
formed part of a larger scheme for the general settlement of our relations in Asia.
It may also be argued that if, when asked, Russia refused to join us in saving
Persia from misrule and possible ruin, and developing a trade lucrative to
herself, we should at least have made her show her hand. Hethertheless, I am
inclined to think that it is very doubtful whether the experiment should be
tried. My belief is that Russia would evade our proposal, and would make
capital out of it at our expense by denouncing us to the Shah and his officials,
who are all interested in maintaining the present state of things. If Russia
did join, she would sooner or later play us false, and leave us to press alone
unpalatable reforms which she would secretly oppose. Our ways are not her
ways, and in the end we should probably be sorry we ever tried to work with
her. She might perhaps agree to divide Persia with us, but I do not believe
she would seriously help us in trying to regenerate Persia.
It must be remembered, too, that the coercion of Persia by Russia and
England in the manner indicated would tend to destroy in her all spirit of
independence, and would accustom her to be treated as a subordinate State.
That might be rather a dangerous lesson for us to teach her.
Altogether, attractive as the scheme is at first sight, I do not think it
holds out a good prospect of success. That, however, is a matter of opinion,
and it might be worth while to sound the Russian Government as to the principle
of the proposal.
11 . I have not tried to ascertain the views of the Russian Legation on
this subject. The Russian Minister, M. de Blitzow, is a most agreeable man,
but he is very reserved and cautious. He would not, I feel sure, commit
himself to an opinion, and it would not probably be desirable for me to sound
him unless authorized to do so. I have given him more than one opportunity
of discussing Persian affairs in a friendly spirit, but he seems to be afraid of
speaking to me on the subject.
12 . If we are not to try the experiment of coming to an understanding
with Russia for the regeneration of Persia, it remains to be considered what we
can do independently of her. At the outset of this inquiry we may, I suppose,
put aside all idea of ousting or overcoming her influence, and of gaining an
exclusive or predominant influence ourselves. It is true that Islam is still a
living force.
* The country about Tehran itself affords a good example of what might be done. Some little
water is brought down by underground channels from the long line of mountains 6 or 7 miles away,
and wherever it is used for irrigation fine trees and crops spring up; but the bulk of the water
supply is allowed to run to waste. Every year, with the melting of the snows, brown torrents pour
across the plain, cutting deep channels through the stony soil, and destroying the so-called roads,
and making it almost impossible to take a carriage outside the rampart. A few well-built dams
along the foot of the range would bring under cultivation a great stretch of fertile country now lying
barren.—H. M. D.
Joint demand for
reforms.
oj 3 |
Russia would be
unlikely to support
serious reforms.
Danger of entering on
joint policy.
Reticence of Russian
Minister with regard
to Russian policy.
British action indepen
dent of Russia.
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