‘Seistan Persia & Seistan’ [‎158v] (325/617)

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Possibility of forming
a Mahommedan
League.
Combination]
improbable.
Impossibility of
carrying out general
scheme of reform.
Vested interests.
Sadr-i-Azam,
Naib-us-Sultaneh,
Shah’s " pishkesh.”
Customs.
, ... ,, countries which stiU retain their indepen-
If the principal Ma^on - , , 0 f banding themselves together
deuce could be brought lose ^ , threatens all alike, England with her
for defence against the °" el * ...in b P fbe natural head of a great League
60,000,000 of Indian Mussulmans would he the natural , W0 uld
which would hold Southern Asia from the ^Bosphorus to J J r
command the sympathies o . ■ er t be fatal dissensions among the
‘ P.™.. »• t.o to.ia. to e,ch other, .ml too
mio-ht not he prudent m our own mterestb, even n L
^Xtt'trrconSon it is, though conceivably possible in the
^ ” 1 a chance of ousting Russian
highest degree unlikely that we shall ever have a chance of ou
influence from Persia, and bringing the country under our political control. V e
must evidently be content for the present to aim at something less.
, 3 Verv little I think, can be done to improve the position through the
medium of countries other than Russia. The more foreign capital_ is invested
in Persia the better, from one point of view. Everything of the kind tends to
consolidate the country and draw upon it the attention of Em ope. But Persia
is not in a condition to attract foreign capital, and until it does so foreign
nations will not trouble themselves about it. I have found the Reiman, Austiian,
and Belgian Legations very friendly, and nave received help, from them in
minor matters ; but for all practical purposes England and Russia are the only
Powers represented in Tehran. We must depend on ourselves for anything
we want to do in this country.*
14. That being the case, we must, I fear, resign the hope of carrying any
general scheme of reform, and making Persia a well-ruled, flourishing country.
Some administrative improvements we may gradually succeed in introducing,
but the task will not be an easy one, for even if Russia does not oppose us,
evei^ reform must involve damage to powerful vested interests, and there is
apparently no one in Persia who has a real patriotic desire to set matters
straight.
For example, the sale of Governorships is the cause of untold oppression.
Our great friend, the Firman A Persian word meaning a royal order or decree issued by a sovereign, used notably in the Ottoman Empire (sometimes written ‘phirmaund’). Farma, was recently appointed to the Governor
ship of Kerman. For this appointment he had to pay to the Shah 10,000/., to
the Sadr-i-Azam 2 , 000 /., and to others smaller sums. These gifts will have to
be repeated, perhaps increased, next March, if he is to keep his place for
another year, tie is now said to be squeezing the people very hard to recoup
himself and provide the State revenue, and the same thing is going on all over
the country. But it is useless for us to advocate the proper payment of officials
and the abandonment of the farming system, while the Shah and the Sadr-i-
Azam have both so much to gain by it. Nothing short of a joint authoritative
demand by England and Russia could suffice. The Shah makes, perhaps,
100,000/. a-year in this way, and the Sadr-i-Azam from 10,000/. to 20,000/.
Take another example—the army. One of the first necessities in Persia
is a body of trustworthy troops to support the authority of the Government.
But any attempt at reform in the army touches the Shah’s favourite son, who
makes a large sum yearly by leaving the troops in arrears of pay, and miserably
clothed, and without arms. But if we urged the regular payment of the troops
the Shah would not press his son, and the Russians, with whom he is on very
friendly terms, would probably support him against our interference.
Again, the immoderate issue of copper coin,or “black money ” as the Persians
call it is doing much harm, and may lead to serious trouble. The reason
given ± 01 ’ this unfortunate proceeding is that after paying the “pishkesh”
demanded by the Shah for the farm of the Mint, which amounts to 26 0001
a-year, it is impossible to coin silver at a profit. This, I believe, is true but the
matte! is further complicated by the discovery that the real farmer of the Mint
is the Sadr-i-Azam who, m conversation with me, denounces the iniquity of the
bhah m extorting this payment and ruining the country q 7
,, . A , s °. n f m °re instance of the difficulty of doing anything for tlm reform of
the Administration, I would cite the caseV the Customs GherelsnoTubt
RussLtUyftt vamJ-Thhfr ° n , PU f il t0 “ e 1 first cam<! to Tehran:
1 . g me , the lest of us look on and mark the points.” H. M. D
“ You and the