‘Seistan Persia & Seistan’ [‎159r] (326/617)

that the Persian Customs, properly managed, would yield far more than they
do, but the Sadr-i-Azam farms them from the Shah, and gives about 200 , 000 /.
a-year for them. By sub-letting them himself he makes a profit of about
45,000/. a-year. b^aturally, any real reform of the Customs system, which
would result in the loss of this sum, must be a severe blow to him, though he
says his brother and his subordinates intercept the money.
These examples will perhaps suffice to show how difficult it would be for us
to effect any radical reforms in the Persian Administration. By pressing for
them inconsiderately we run the risk, not only of failure, but of making
ourselves disliked by the Shah and the Sadr-i-Azam and other influential
persons, and of driving them into the arms of Russia.
15. The sphere of our possible action is therefore restricted within
comparatively narrow limits. We could, no doubt, by appealing to the cupidity
of the Shah, get a certain amount done. He will do almost anything for
money. We might, for example, if we secured him a loan which would enable
him to pay off the Regie debt, and to keep a large sum of money for himself,
induce him to hand over to us the management of his Southern Customs, and to
let us try reorganizing his finances. But any such scheme involves, I fear, the
downfall of the Sadr-i-Azam, hitherto regarded as our one strong friend in
Persia, and before he fell he would fight desperately, backed by the Russian
Legation. He is not an altogether blameless Minister according to European
standards, and at times he has been far from satisfactory in his dealings with
us. It is possible, as some believe, that since 1892 he has secretly gone over
to Russia, but he certainly was with us once, and did much to further our
interests, and though not a good administrator, he is probably as good as
others, while he is personally most pleasant to deal with.. So long as he seems
inclined to be friendly it would, I think, be a mistake to force him into
opposition for the sake of introducing reforms which might after all prove
impracticable. I believe it would not be very difficult to overturn him, and in
some ways the Shah would be more manageable than he is; but it is better, in
my opinion, to leave him in undisturbed enjoyment of the income he makes by
ruling the country after Persian methods, and to confine ourselves to the objects
which we may hope to attain with his co-operation.
16. Being unable to put forward any general scheme for the reorganization
of Persia, or to advocate pressure on our part for the institution of any radical
reforms, I can only recommend that we should adhere to the line of policy
which we have followed with more or less energy for many years past. Our
efforts will then be mainly directed to preserving the integrity of Persia,
gaining the good-will, respect, and confidence of the Persian Government and
people, supporting Persia to resist intimidation, watching the proceedings of the
Russians, developing our trade with Persia, and taking any opportunities which
may occur for advocating measures beneficial to the country. It remains
to consider what particular means we should adopt for the accomplishment of
these objects.
17. As to maintaining the integrity of Persia, I have already mentioned
the widespread belief that at the death of the present Shah Russia will make
some serious forward move. I doubt it greatly ; but I think we should admit
the possibility that she may have something of the kind in contemplation, and
should as far as possible guard against it. Though the Shah appears to be in
excellent health, he is no longer a young man, and he tries his constitution in
various ways. It would be as well to prepare beforehand for his death, so that
when it comes we may know exactly what to do. Russia has more than once
given an assurance that she desires to maintain the integrity of Persia, and
both Russia and England have in one way or another recognized the Vali Ahd
as his father’s heir. I think it would be desirable to arrange with the Russians
a scheme of action to be adopted by us both in case the Shah should die in the
Yali Ahd’s lifetime. A joint declaration by Russia and England in favour of
the Yali Ahd immediately on the Shah’s death would, I believe, suffice to deter
the brothers, here and at Ispahan, from any attempt to seize the throne, but
we should settle beforehand what we are going to do, and should show the
Russians that we are not indifferent in the matter. If the British and Russian
Legations received general instructions on this point they could concert details
here, and submit their views for approval. The question is whether Russia and
England agree to support the claim of the Yali Ahd to succeed at his lather s
Restriction of sphere
of British action.
Loan to Persian
Government for pur
pose of financial
reorganization.
Would probably
involve fall of Sadr-i-
Azam.
This undesirable.
General line to be
followed.
Integrity of Persia.
Necessity of prepara
tion in view of Shah's
death.