‘Seistan Persia & Seistan’ [‎169r] (346/617)

X 1 S m a,ster-Greneral he deals with the executive disbursements to the troops. On
him, therefore, devolves the whole responsibility, administrative, financial, and executive.
^ £ S ^ ie . a . rm y acc ounts are theoretically centralized and audited in the
IJaiti oi tne Finance Minister, but the officers of that Department dare not oppose the
favourite son or the Shah, and on the principle of “Live and let live,” interfere as little as
possible with the finances of the Naib-es-Sultaneh.
The system is one of extreme centralization.
I do not propose dealing with the intricate question of army administration further
than is necessary to bring the financial and supply branches into a semblance of order, and
to define the relative position of the Civil and Military Departments of War.
It seems absolutely necessary to breakup the confused organization which now centres Proposals for better
on the Minister of War. This can, perhaps, best be arrived at by relegating the duties of admmistratl0n -
supply and finance to a, civilian War Minister; the duties purely military to a Commander-
in-chief.
The former would be directly responsible to the Council of State, and would be The Minister of War,
assisted by various Directors-General, experts charged with the Supply Departments of his Directors-Generai
War under the responsibility of the Minister. of Supply Depart-
.A 1 inanciai ^ecictciry would deal with tho nccounts of the cirmy. This officcr^s duty Financial Secretary*
would comprise the compilation of the Estimate for inclusion in the Budget of the Minister
of Finance, the issues of all moneys to the Supply Departments, the administration of the
Army Fay Department, the primary audit before submission to the Great Accounts
Department, the Daftr for final scrutiny by the Board of Accounts of the Council.
I cannot insist too strongly on the importance of a thorough check on the army
expenditure. The accounts of the Financial Secretary would be first examined in his own
cheeking office by accountants nominated by the Minister of War, and chosen from other
than the Mustauffi class of the Daftr.
They would then be passed on for rigid audit in the Daftr of the Minister of Finance
(vide “Finance” or “Daftr,” Part II, Paper No. 4), and by him would be submitted to
the Council of State for final scrutiny by their Board of Accounts.
The military branch would he under the orders of the Commander-in-chief, who The Commander-m-
would be responsible for the personnel of the ai’my, its drill and discipline. Being chief,
directly responsible to the Council of State, and not to the Minister of War, he would act
as a check on the latter, and would see that the army were not starved, either as regards
establishment, war material, or pay. I would add much to the importance of this office!'
by extending his duties to the provinces, and by bringing the whole army under one
military control. At present the powers of the Minister of War in his capacity as
Commander-in-chief are limited to a certain extent; for instance, the Zil-es-Sultan
practically commanding che troops in his Governorship, the Vali Ahd commanding those
in Azerbaijan, the Governor-General doing the same in Khorassan.
Whether under the changed order suggested it would be advisable to retain the
services of the Naib-es-Sultaneh is very doubtful. The increased power of the Commander-
in-chief might act as a sop to his vanity, and induce him to remain in office, but under no
circumstances should any son of the Shah be allowed to occupy a position directly dealing
with finance. This should be reserved entirely for a civilian officer.
The principle is the same as that on which I would bar any official occupying a
position equalling or excelling that of the Naib-es-Sultaneh (the Sadr Azm, for example)
-concerning himself directly and personally with any of the Finance Departments of the
State.
No. 3 .—Ministry of Interior.
This very important Ministry is now merged with that of Finance, both being Present view of the
conducted by the Sadr Azm, the de facto, though not nominal, Minister of these great Ministry,
branches of the public service.
In Part I, Papers Nos. 1 and 2, the questions affecting Interior and Finance, such as
the sale of office, the appointment of Governors, the system of revenue, have been entered
into, and though it can hardly be said that Interior and Finance require reorganization in
anv more urgent degree than any other branches of the Service, yet the scope of their
dealings has'such vital bearing on public interests that the urgency of reform is here even
move apparent, and demands most careful attention.
I have throughout the present papers urged the necessity of dividing responsibility. Proposals for better-
and of making the different Ministers actual, not nominal, Chiefs of Departments. Secondly, administration,
of introducing a practical and efficient control of the public finances. To carry out this
programme, the duties of Interior and Finance must be separated, and the functions
conducted independently one of the other.
The nature of the office of the Sadr Azm is such that he might very properly fill the
place of the Minister of Interior. The duties I would limit—
1. To the nomination of provincial Governors and Sub-Governors.
2. To the control of the provincial administration.
3. To the control of the police, safety of roads, and sanitary measures.