‘Seistan Persia & Seistan’ [‎169v] (347/617)

28
A, regards item 1, the nomination of Governors I have referred more particularly to
this in the article on provincial admm.strafaon. Pa 111,1 ape / estabUshment of
, With reference to the du.es of the Minister of Interior, like all
general system m the pio\m nermanent staff removed from the accidents of
<- *• ^ - «*
exdatmdl^rart^rlpef No! 8 ;!^rpe^mnent l^reterjC On this organization of a
permanent staff I lay great stress. Through its agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. the Minister uill be brought into
K touch with the provinces; a body of trained men will be maintained m whom the
Minister has confidence, dependent on him for the orders they may receive, and indepen
dent of the personal idiosyncrasies of the temporary Governor The power of the Central
Government will thus be enormously increased, and we should not see, as at present, the
orders of Government set on one side by the obstruction or bad will of the Governor.
Proposals for reform.
Proposal for separation
of the Ministries of
Interior and Finance.
Proposals for the
employment of the
Mustauffi class.
Proposal for the
better administration
of the Ministerial
accounts.
Proposal for subject*
ing the Daftr, or
Ministry of Finance,
to high scrutiny of the
Board of Accounts
of the Council of
State.
As regards perma
nency in system of
finance in provinces.
Proposal for perma
nency of staff.
No. 4.—Ministry of Finance.
According to the present order of finance in Persia, the great accounting Department
of the kingdom is the Daftr, a central organization composed chiefly of accountants called
Mustauffis, by whom not only are the central accounts administered, hut also every account
of any importance, whether it be provincial, Ministerial, or local. Held together by ties of
birth and self-interest, they are able to manipulate the accounts with impunity. The
system may be described as the outcome of a great swindling corporation with feelers
extending to the furthermost limits.
The Daftr treats the Ministerial and provincial Estimates which are drawn up by the
Mustauffis nominated from the Daftr for the purpose. It then compiles the Budget,
prepares the Memorandums of expenditure (vide Part I, Paper No. 2), issues or checks
the special orders directing disbursements, finally centralizes and audits all accounts. In
fact, from first to last, it controls every financial transaction of importance.
Eeform should, I venture to think, seek—
1. To limit the field and influence of the Mustauffis.
2. To prevent their interference with the finances of the Ministers or provinces except
in so far as their legitimate audit is concerned.
3: To establish a higher and more responsible agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. for the final acceptance of the
accounts of the kingdom, to which the Accounts Department of the Finance Minister
would be subordinate.
4. To create more permanency in the system of finance in the provinces.
5. To centralize under the Finance Administration the Treasury, the Customs and
Mint.
The first step will be to separate the Ministries of Interior and Finance, for both
cannot be controlled by one personage, and under no circumstances should 'the chief
finance ° f ^ ^ ^ adr Azn b have an y direct dealings with this Ministry, i.e., with
I would therefore make Finance into a distinct Ministry, under a capable and trusted
official, noted for his integrity and courage.
It goes without saying that he cannot he a member of the Mustaufii corporation.
Now, as regards the Mustauffis, their proper field is in the Daftr of the Minister of
Finance, and there alone should they be employed.
Their duties would be concerned with the examination of the Ministerial FsHmatP*
the compilation of the Budget, the preparation of the Memorandums of expenditure fvide
Part I Paper No 2), and the audit of the Ministerial and other accounts P (
Ministry^wilTlmve^its ^wn^Teparate^Accounts^Offic 8 "bf “”*‘7 OT P™™ces, each
"‘"l: '.SS*?" "" """
Accounts Department of th"Mifisto e om t ™‘ CapabIe 7 f . dealin S with the au dit of the
high duty will be performed ToLd of 1 “nnt V ?° insisted This
already mentioned*this B„ard y ( Part Il f aoer No D » d " i 0 ™™ 1 f State - 1 ha ve
sa~*~ - -i H's.rc’i :s c“ass s:;.™
finance iftbVpZhTeT Tsvstem whkh^auXf for foT permanenc y in system of
person of the chief agent of the Minister ^, 1? t . . stanoe > a constant change in the
Only be detrimental fo efficieney " * ' ^ PeShkar ’ or “ Va ™,” is one whiS can
I he Peshkar is the rio-fit hnnrl man -t-u n
administration of the Revenue, the issues