'Koweit: A Report' [‎45r] (98/140)

9
i populat
ie manner
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El Hasa,
the east
family tc
i in Neji
i 1897.
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97, Yusu
h Sheikl
: («.«•, it
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ly quarrel
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e Turkis!
f Depuf
d a stean
claims c
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ie tribe o
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liance fa
tributed
. The new Am,r of Abdul Aziz ibn Rashid, lost no time
in commencing operations against Mubarak, ostensibly in the
interests of the dispossessed son of the late Sheikh of Koweit
but chiefly, no doubt, with a view to his own aggrandisement. '
In January 1898, he advanced to within three marches of
Koweit but disturbances among Bedouin tribes in his rear
caused him to retire hastily to Nejd. From that time to this
however, there appears to have existed a standing quarrel and
a chronic state of war between Mubarak and Ibn Rashid • it may
be useful, therefore, to follow the course of events, as closely as
may be, though the labour of doing so is considerable, and the
difticu ty of ascertaining the truth is extreme. The accounts of
fights known to have taken place are usually in direct contradic
tion, both factions claiming an overwhelming victory, and
ascribing a correspondingly crushing defeat to their adversaries.
Probably the interval between Ibn Rashid’s retirement to
his own country and his next advance against Koweit, was
occupied in consolidating his power in his own dominions. In
the autumn of 1900, he once more advanced against Koweit,
but first turned his attack against the Muntafik tribe fnear
Zobeir and north of Basrah), old allies of Mubarak’s. In a'fioht
which took place near Zobeir, in October, he was at first partially
successful, but in a counter-attack he was severely enough
handled to make him apply for Turkish support and reinforce
ment as being a vassal of the Porte.
. The Turkish authorities are believed to have ordered him to
desist from military operations; but Mubarak, soon after, heard
that he was advancing on Koweit with a force estimated at 20,000
men, of whom, however, some 1,000 men only had modern
rifles.
That same month, October 1900, Abdul Aziz bin Abdul
Rahman bin Feysul, a descendant of the old reigning family of
Nejd, is said to have .engaged. Ibn Rashid, presumably after the
alter had withdrawn into the interior from his operations against
the Muntafik tribe, which have just been mentioned.
Abdul Aziz bin Feysul called upon Mubarak for his support
and co-operation, a request which Mubarak, probably nothing
oth, complied with, by despatching a force of 10,000 men,
believed to have been mostly armed with Martinis, under two of
his sons, of which he took command himself a little later. In
the early part of 1901, he seems to have had a series of
successes, driving the forces of Ibn Rashid west and south-west
until, by the middle of February, he occupied the capital, Hayil.
It is said that the Arab forces of Ibn Rashid were badly armed
and could make no effective stand against the better armed men
of Koweit, and their rifle fire.