'Papers relating to transfer of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Colonial Office and creation of a new Department there, 1920-1921, with Cabinet notes of Milner, Montague, Churchill, self, and others' [‎15v] (30/136)

These three vilayets form an indivisible whole. The Mosul vilayet has no natural
economic connection with Turkey or Syria, and distrust and objections arising from our
abandonment of Suleimaniyah, Arbil and Mosul Divisions, and inevitable anarchy
resulting from removal of external control in these areas would have the gravest effect
throughout the rest of Mesopotamia.
We cannot appreciably reduce our responsibilities in this country without leaving
it altogether and incidentally without repudiating engagements to Persia.
Practical experience and theoretical consideration of the changes (? combine) alike
to convince me that right solution for us, if we are to stay here at all, is to adopt
armistice line without substantial alteration as our boundary, vide my telegram dated
2nd February, No. 1539. This brings Amadia within the federation; we should
continue to administer it indirectly as at present and its inclusion would facilitate
repatriation of refugees.
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief has seen above aud concurs in its terms.
APPENDIX D.
From General Officer Commanding, Mesopotamia, to War Office.
Despatched 1200, 3rd May, 1920.
(No. X. 8629, cipher. 3rd May.) Received 0915, 4th May, 1920.
During the summer extensive reductions cannot be carried out, especially as
probable publication of peace terms, and of our intentions regarding the future
constitution of this country, may be followed by a time of doubt and difficulty. If,
however, the summer passes without serious disturbances, if Royal Air Force in this
country is increased to its full accepted establishment, with thoroughly, effective
mechanical personnel; if I may be given (?) Tanks and personnel to man an extra
company of armoured cars and a thoroughly efficient system of wireless communication,
and if units are kept up to full establishment, I hope it may be possible to propose
definite reductions early in the autumn, pending time whemlocally raised forces become
sufficiently efficient to take up some of the duties now performed by troops, to the
forces foreshadowed by my predecessor in his No. X. 7538, and possibly for the further
reduction of a mixed brigade, leaving one division, one cavalry brigade, with some lines
of communication units, at Basra, as the total military garrison of Mesopotamia.
Should this condition be established. I must emphasize that I shall be in a position
only to maintain internal security, and not to resist external aggression, nor to reinforce
or assist Persia if invaded. I propose to telegraph further shortly after (?) again
examining facts and figures.