'Papers relating to transfer of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Colonial Office and creation of a new Department there, 1920-1921, with Cabinet notes of Milner, Montague, Churchill, self, and others' [‎53r] (105/136)

Circulated by the S ecretary ol State tor In dia.
SECRET.
With Mr. OliurcliiH’s concuiTeuce, I circulate to my colleagues the following
telegram which has been a'Mressed to the Secretary of State for India by Sir
Percy C^ox.
Teleqram from U'xjh Commissioner, Mesopotamia, to Secretary of State for India,
dated 29lh January 1921.
291 S. Your telegram of the )8th January, 389, to India. Persian situation.
It is impossible to prophesy what precisely will ensue on the withdrawal of
Xorperforce, as it depends on two factors at present (? obscure), i.e., iirstly, whether
two or three months hence Bolsheviks will have the will and ability to (? undertake)
military occupation of North Persia, and secondly, whether, in the last resort, His
Majesty’s Government will still be prepared to incur some further expenditure in
Persia to save remnants of situation (? and) greater loss. (? As regards the) first
problem, the agreement said to have been concluded, or ou the point ol* being
-(? concluded), between Soviets (? and) Persia, doubtless oilers no safeguard against
prosecution of Bolsheviks’ programme of aggressive expansion, nevertheless, it is
difficult to believe that they will proceed to extremities immediately after having
concluded such an agreement with Persia, and having been deprived, by the
withdrawal of the troops, of their last excuse for armed intrusion into Persia.
It will be remembered that they were (? expected to) occupy Tabriz directly
it was left open, but they have not yet (? done so). In this connection it
is worth noting that, when the first news of our intended evacuation was telegraphed
by Teheran merchants to their correspondents here, general panic ensued, lor it was
regarded as portending loss of not less than four millions sterling to Baghdad
merchants, in the shape of outstandings or stocks of merchandise left in Persia
without hope of recovery. This panic, however, in a general measure subsided when
it became known that Persia was on the point of concluding a treaty with the Soviets,
as it was believed that such a treaty, combined with our retirement, would put an end
to Bolshevik activities in Persia and re-open trade route between Baghdad and Enzeli.
'This is doubtless a (? sanguine) outlook, but for many reasons it is greatly to be
desired that the withdrawal of* Europeans from Teheran could have been postponed,
or at all events left to take its natural course without pressure, ft is easy to imagine
the lamentable picture of apparent British impotence and collapse before the Bolshevik
menace, which will he presented to the public of this region by the stream of women
and children trickling down Teheran-Baghdad road, under circumstances of grave
discomfort and hardships, resulting from severe winter conditions, and with our
troops following on their heels. ft would have been infinitely less harmful if the
civilian evacuation could have been deferred, at any rate until the immediate effect of
our military withdrawal, both'on Bolsheviks and Teheran public, had become
apparent; and then (if it were inevitable) if it could have taken the form of a gradual
exodus to*or via Ispahan in the spring. L note the reasons given by His Majesty’s
Minister for putting that route out of the question, but 1 shall venture to revert to the
subject later on.
As to the question of tinancial assistance, 1 understand that His .Majesty s
Government have suspended all subsidies to Central Government, and intend to cease
financing South Persian Rides from 1st April. It is clear Irom the papers that this
policy has been forced upon the Cabinet, by the insistanee of the public at home on
drastic reduction of expenditure. But unless some alternative constructive policy can
be devised, to counteract its destructive effect, adoption of such a line of action will
entail complete collapse of commercial position in Persia, which it has taken genera
tions to establish. It will react both (? commercially) and politically in Afghanistan
and Mesopotamia, and in the latter case will greatly upset the calculations on which
we have formed our Budget. It seems to amount to this—if His Majesty’s Govern
ment are prepared to continue to incur certain expenditure in Persia to save remnants
of our position, something can no doubt be done and is worth doing. U they are not
so prepared, but insist on withholding all further financial assistance, I see no
alternative but to evacuate our women and children, not only from Teheran, but from
all towns in Persia, and simply leave those who will not come away or whose presence
until the last moment is.a necessity, to await the development of chaos.
Reverting to Bolshevik menace, I am aware that there is a section of Persian
public in Teheran (corrupt group) who see in Bolshevism, as they see in other forms
3320 100 2.21