'Papers relating to transfer of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Colonial Office and creation of a new Department there, 1920-1921, with Cabinet notes of Milner, Montague, Churchill, self, and others' [‎53v] (106/136)

of anarchy, golden opportunities for enriching themselves. 1 am convinced, however,
that the people of Persia in general are not prone to welcome Bolshevism, and will
hold out against it if given any solid foundation to stand on. .
As regards Anglo-Persian agreement. Fair and reasonable document as it is,
it has become such a red herring to the Bolshevik, and such a pretext lor Extremist
propaganda, that 1 agree with the Government of India that we must drop it m its
present form as a basis of policy. On the other hand, it is difficult lo conceive any
scheme of financial assistance calculated to save Persian situation which His Majesty s
Government could be expected to enter upon without protecting themselves by some
agreement of same kind. .
I now beg to (? submit emitted) for consideration two lines ol policy ior adoption
according to circumstances. The first is that we should not assume that all is lost m
Teheran. The trend of recent intelligence reports regarding Bolshevik plans rather
indicates that they have other pre-occupations for the present, ue should decide,
therefore, to delay evacuation of women and children at any rate until the eaily
summer, then, if it proves (? word omitted), it should take the lorm ol a gradual
exodus to Ispahan and Shiraz, but in co-operation with Bakhtians. 1 am aware that
here the main difficulty lies in the question of transport, but it seems quite possible
that mule transport can be collected at Ispahan, and a convoy of vans be sent up iom
Bush ire via Shiraz, on which route they would have the protection of the kouth
Persian Rifles. Meanwhile, we should rally our adherents at the capital amongst
moderate Nationalists and non-Bolshevik elements, who are convinced that the
country can only be saved from anarchy with our help. W e should devise another
agreement which the Majlis will accept, and on basis of which H is Majesty s on em
inent will continue to help Persia. It is quite possible that such an agreement may
involve our acquiescence in a change of Shah or change of dynasty and 1 do not
think that we should hesitate in giving it. In any ease, attitude of Bakhtiaris will be
an important factor, and I do not at all agree with the view expressed by His Majesty s
Minister that they are essentially unfriendly. On the contrary, I believe they are
fully alive to advantages of friendly relations with us, and, provided their interests
are safeguarded and promoted, the majority of them could begot to participate with
us in anv scheme for the saving of Persia from chaos.
Supposing that it is decided that (? word omitted) has gone too far to admit of
the adoption of the above policy, or if it is tried and fails, then 1 think we must make
up our minds to let Northern Persia go Bolshevik if it wishes to; but in that case,
provided again that we are prepared to spend some money, l see no reason why we
should not hope to maintain our interests and effective influence in the sphere in
which they mainly exist, and which 1 should include by a line passing liom^ tin
Persian frontier near Khanikin, through Kermanshah, Khurumabad, Ispahan, 'l ezd,
Kerman, and so on, and I think our policy should be to stabilise situation in that area.
In fact, it seems to me impossible that we can do otherwise than endeavour to ensure
safetv of our numerous and vital oil interests in this part of Persia, name]}, neai
Qasr-i-Shirin, in Pushtikuh, in Arabistan, and in Bakhtiari country. Maintenance of
close relations with Bakhtiaris is essential to both parties, and we must remember
that Ispahan, Yezd and Kerman are now in the hands of. Bakhtiari governois. In
the event of a collapse of the Government at Teheran, and the flight of the Shah,
I think we should (? allow the) Wall of Pushtikuh, the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and
the Bakhtiaris to declare their independence, or their separation irom Government ol
Teheran, and should encourage them to make a three-cornered pact among themselves
to stand together to maintain their own interests and resist Bolshevik aggression. \\ e
should probably (? do omitted) well to have Kashgais (corrupt group) m too. All
four elements are mainly (? tribal) and already practically independent (? full stop).
They would only need a hint to induce turbulent tribes (? to omitted) take action but
for us it would lie important that they should act together, burh a confedeiution
would oiler a very formidable bulwark to Bolshevik aggression, as well as pi election
of our own material and legitimate interests in Persia. If this line of policy be
favourably entertained, it seems to me that we should do all that is possible to
expedite improvement of communications. from South outwards, namely, Irom
Khanikin to Kermanshah,from Mohammerah to Khurumabad, and roads from Ahwaz,
Bushire and Bandar Abbas. .
1 would venture to suggest that, if the above suggestions are considered to
provide basis for any constructive line of policy, representatives of all the chief British
firms with commercial stakes in Persia should be called together for discussion of the
subject, in order that it may be known wdiat amount of co-operation may be expected
from them.