'Papers relating to transfer of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Colonial Office and creation of a new Department there, 1920-1921, with Cabinet notes of Milner, Montague, Churchill, self, and others' [‎64r] (127/136)

In my opinion, if chaos is to be avoided no reduction in the forces already
sanctioned in Troopers 8676.°> D.M.O., dated 1st November, can be made until
Arabs, or other forces, have proved themselves able to take the place of our troops,
both for maintaining internal order and for resisting external aggression.
2. As regards the Air Force scheme, see my 0/184/106 dated 25th November.
As a result of experience during 1920 1 do not consider that the scheme, which
would involve a large reduction of troops, could be applied to Mesopotamia without
grave risks until the Royal Air Force have proved that they can maintain law and
order in the country.
Though a valuable auxiliary, 1 do not consider the Royal Air Force can yet be
considered as a primary force. For final restoration of order in any disturbed area and
for (? protection of) communication, land forces are essential, and until the Royal Air
Force are in a position to carry out the functions of transporting troops and war
material all communication to air stations must be adequately guarded. For the
relief of invested (? posts), land forces and transport are essential.
I have begun to experiment air control on the Upper Euphrates, and propose
depending on that force to maintain order in the Middle Euphrates area between
Hillah and Nasiriyah, to which I have allotted no troops.
Neither of these involved outlying air stations, with small garrisons liable to be
invested as Air Force, will be supplied from Baghdad or Shaibah.
To apply this control at Mosul and Kirkuk would be dangerous. These areas
are contiguous to the Turkish frontier and aerodomes would be liable to attack by
artillery. Immediate relief of garrisons might be necessary and external attack
would be certain, to cause internal disturbances, to repress which all my mobile forces
would be required. There is ample evidence of intention on the part of the Turks to
make an attack on Mosul and reduction of troops there would precipitate their
actions.
3. 1 have received your 87463, dated 10th .January, and will reply after further
consultation with Sir Percy Cox.
6 From Secretary of State to High Commissioner, Mesopotamia,
1 oth January 1921.
Priority A.
, 314. Personal and Secret. Secretary of State for India’s telegram of the
9th instant. We must carefully distinguish between policy and method. Do you
think that Feisal is the right man and the best man ? Failing him, do you prefer
Abdullah to any local man? Have you put forward' Feisal because you consider
taking a long view he is the best man or as a desperate expedient in the hopes of
reducing the garrisons quickly ? If you are really convinced that Feisal is necessary,
can you make sure he is chosen locally ? Once I know your true mind on these points
decision can be taken here immediately. We can then consider method of bringing
about what we have decided on in the most favourable and diplomatic manner. Ido
not think Cabinet would allow French objection to debar us from taking the best course.
I do not think it would be impossible to placate the French provided matters are
handled with them candidly and courteously. Anyhow, do not let us slip into taking
the wrong man against our better judgment.
Part 11. Telegraph to me separately explaining when you propose National
Assembly should meet and what its basis of election will be. I presume these
conditions will be prescribed in relation to the end we have in view, namely, the good
government of the country and the honourable discharge of our mandate without
undue expense. Western political methods are not necessarily applicable to the East.
Send me full information of your plan.
A nswered by Nos. 11 and 12.
7 From High Commissioner, Mesopotamia, loth January 1921.
(Received 16th, 10 a.m.)
Clear the line.
Private and personal.
222 S. My telegram 186 S. In view of despatch of General Haldane’s telegram
1192 of the 13th instant, and the possibility of its urgent consideration by the Cabinet,