'Papers relating to transfer of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Colonial Office and creation of a new Department there, 1920-1921, with Cabinet notes of Milner, Montague, Churchill, self, and others' [‎64v] (128/136)

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I venture to submit mv comment too, without awaiting the reply to my telegiam ubovr
• quoted. I will first comment on General Officer Commanding s telegram. _
iiy,.,, i —I agree but subject to reservation that provided that a division is
maintained in Baghdad and Mosul Vilayats, and the reduction begins m Basra
Vilayat, I would be prepared, as far as I can see at pr.-sent to risk tiie reduction to
one division and one brigade bv end ol 1.121, 01 sjuing ut 1.'
division and one brigade I mean strength of trained forces, with necessary proportion
of British t,, Indian!, whether they are called Imperial Bohee, or Volunteers, or by
other convenient designation.
Para. 2.—I agree that, while the Royal Air Force will be a valuable auxiliary, it
can be nothing more for present purposes, and its employment will “ (,t "^essai i y
allow reduction ol land forces below my minimum estimate. We bare to remun ,
moreover, that it is a most expensive arm to maintain.
With the rest of General Otlieer Commanding’s telegram 1 generally concui.
•1 now offer comment on your telegram. f
My primary observation is that the evacuation of the Mosul \ ll; ^ at | ’. at th ^ t ‘ I ,
proposed by you or at anytime before the National Government, or 1 1 is Majesty s
Government are in a position to replace onr troops by other forces, is mcompa i )
with acceptance of mandate. „ j
Secondlv, I am sure neither your proposal nor the efforts ot National Government o
create their own forces can sufficiently materialise in time to admit oi commeneemeiv
of evacuation on arrival of General Ironside’s forces at Ivhanikin. General Haldane s
observation that he could begin to withdraw from Mosul at that moment, was simp y
a statement of military possibilities, made without consultation with me, and taking no
account of the political aspect of such a project, or ol the chaos which would lesult, i
it were put into execution. I took steps to make this clear directly his telegram was
L fear that vou attach much too much importance to eifect of suppression ol
present rebellion and the collection of 50,000 rifles in the process 1 rovn ed that,
they arc not again subjected to violent propaganda from outside, and that toioes ioi
the maintenance of internal security are not prematurely reduced below' the sate
minimum, I had every hope that lesson winch they have now learned will last the
tribes some time. (? lint we) must remember that those of lower Euphrates are
traditionally prone to rise against authority, whenever they reahse that the Govern
ment is weak, and it is not safe to assume that if our armed strength is unduly
weakened and propaganda renewed, they could not be got to rise again. In any case,
the future of the Government depends on its ability to collect revenue, and these
.tribes will never pay revenue unless they kmnv that Central Government is m a
position to enforce payment in the last resort. It is true that 50,000 rifles will have
been collected during our military operations, but fresh supplies are all the time
coming in, and Jaafar Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , who has just returned from a tour in the disturbed
districts estimates that there are still 500,000 rifles in Irak.
In conclusion, 1 venture to touchupon personal question. You are aware that
after two or three weeks of discussion in London I was assured that His Majesty s-
Government had definitely decided to accept mandate and to stay where they now are
as lono- as it was necessary to maintain their ohligation(s) under it. On this assurance
[ agreed to come out and undertook to devote all my (, J efforts) first to the early
formation of a National Government and then to speedy creation of national forces m
order to relieve His Majesty’s Government gradually of the great expense at present
borne by them in the maintenance of their army in this country. So far I have not
(? failed in) my part of the task, and, although I have many ditliculties to contend
with and many others ahead, 1 have every (? hope of) continuing to make satisfactory
progress towards the end in view, provided that pace is nor, unduly iorced. >
> ' ”1 C an assure you that premature evacuation, or even talk of evacuation, especially
at the moment when we are by no means free from menace of hostilities from the
north in the spring will inevitably be cause of the collapse not only of the present
provisional Government but of whole machinery of civil administration in Baghdad
and Mosul vilayats now in critical state of transition.
1 will reply separately regarding itinerary of your proposed visit to Mesopotamia
after further consultation’with General Officer Commanding-in-Chief to whom lam
giving a copy of this telegram.