Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎91r] (181/348)

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are now sending Signor Tuozzi to Angora and that they are really as anxious as
ever to secure economic concessions from Turkey in southern Asia Minor.
In these circumstances it would probably be impossible for Great Britain
alone to enable Greece to defeat the Kemalists and to hold Smyrna in the face of
a benevolent French attitude towards the Kemalists, quite apart from the
outweighing disadvantages of risking a split in the Entente.
If these considerations are sound, it follows that if a profitable mediation is
to be offered Great Britain must press upon the Greeks something like the Paris
proposals of June with regard to Smyrna. These proposals might conceivably be
made more palatable to ,Greece by abolishing any customs barrier between the
Smyrna province and Greece, and possibly by admitting Greece, so far ^ as the
Smyrna province is concerned, to the Tripartite Agreement or to the under
standing between gentlemen which, it was proposed at Paris in June, should
take the place of the Tripartite Agreement.
In addition His Majesty’s Government might offer recognition of King
Constantine and possibly facilities for raising a loan here, though I doubt very
much whether the French Government would join in any such proceeding. It is
also a matter for consideration whether the islands in the Sea of Marmara left to
Turkey by the Treaty of Sevres but ethnologically Greek might not be given to
(^•eeQe. They could not be garrisoned, as they are in the demilitarised area.
Lastly, we shall have to insist on the Italians returning the Dodecanese even
if it is too much to hope that they will throw in the concession of Rhodes.
If, however, the Greeks are to be brought to accept such a solution as the
above of the Smyrna area, it seems politically impracticable to change the
settlement of Thrace provided for in the Treaty of Sevres in the direction
apparently desired by both the French and the Italians at the Paris Conference in
June (the creation of an international zone under an international gendarmerie).
Both on ethnological grounds and more especially in order to secure that the
Dardanelles shall remain open, it seems essential that the Dardanelles peninsula
and the northern shore of the Marmara, at any rate as far as Rodosto, should
remain in Greek hands. This would rule out the return of Northern Thiace to
Turkey or acceptance of the Enos-Midia line (which is no natural frontier)
as the Graeco-Turkish boundary. The Kemalists, and the French supporting
them, ask for the return of Thrace or for its internationalisation in order the
better to defend Constantinople. There are other ways of meeting this : («) The
Treaty of Sevres frontier can be brought across from its present point south of
Midi a to a point on the northern shore of the Sea of Marmara nearer Rodosto.
(b) Greek troops in Eastern Thrace (as opposed to gendarmerie) might be stationed
only in certain places and in fixed numbers. Correspondingly the number of
Turkish troops in European Turkey would have to be fixed. (c) There would
remain, to safeguard both Turkey and Greece, the existence of an international
commission of the Straits and of an Allied force, however small, at the Dardanelles
end of the Straits. Greek troops might participate in this garrison on the
European shore and Turkish troops in the Allied garrison on the Asiatic shore.
In addition, it must be remembered that we have promised our support for
the strengthening of article 15 of the Greek Minority Treaty in such a way as to
give the Moslem majority of Adrianople the predominant share in the executive
functions and in the ministerial council, and some stronger provision regarding
non-interference by the Greek Government with the management of Moslem
sacred shrines or places of Moslem worship, the immunities of the latter to be
guaranteed. _ . .
II. I pass to the considerations that more directly affect the Allies m relation
to Turkey. While we have no clear indication of what precise modifications of the
Treaty of Sevres, apart from Thrace and Smyrna, would satisfy the Kemalists,
it seems qertain that in order to obtain a settlement now, the Allies may have to
go further than the concessions offered in London in March last (see Annex I
to this memorandum) in the direction of saving the face of the Turks so far
as the financial provisions of the treaty are concerned.
At Paris in June M. Briand told me that with regard to finance, in which
French interests were paramount, he would be willing to seek a method of
securing essential control that would not offend Nationalist susceptibilities. He
probably meant abolishing the Financial Commission and falling back on the
pre-war Debt Council. Our objection to this has always been that although the
machinery of the Public Debt is very efficient, and although we and the Italians
are represented equally with the French on the Council, the French Government,
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