Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎91v] (182/348)

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Allied claims. ^ Under the Treaty ui ocwco e—^ f nr the
resources (revenues assigned to the Debt and other souiees o . occunation
payment not only of the pre-war Debt, but also of the cos o therefore it
and the payment of Allied war claims ior damages, &c. ° Treaty of
would be preferable to maintain the financial provisions of the c . ^
Sevres and in some form or other the substitution of t ic inancr / \ A t
for the pre-war Debt Council. Having regard, hcmevei, o in ‘ , British
French financial interests in Turkey are greater than n isi, thr> u
economic interests in Turkey (share of imports and exports) are gieatei than
French, and (b, that the Keinalists object to a body like the
mission under the Treaty of Sevres, which is responsible o 10 k ‘ u '
practically executive powers, as an infringement of their independence, a \\ ay
out ” might be found by going back more or less to the pre-w ar sys em
advisers to Turkish Ministries. The French might appoint an adviser to t_,
Ministry of Finance who would be a servant of the Turkish Govern men , w g
appoint an adviser to the Ministry of Customs; and the Italians an advisei to
the Ministries concerned with concessions. The financial and economic o y
of Turkey under the Treaty of Sevres would remain, and these three advisers
might form a council for advising the Turkish Government as to how best to meet
their obligations. This plan would, of course, mean that we should recognise and
make permanent the French preponderant control of Turkish finance. It wouk
also mean that we should rely on the personality and influence of the Allied
representatives to ensure Turkey meeting all her obligations. o S<1 » ‘
ourselves against French pre-war and war claims against Tm icing cic
our own, owing to the preponderant French influence at the Ministry of Finance
we might have to make a separate agreement with the French Govern men t
regarding priority of payments, &c. These are very tentative suggestions, and the
Treasury might have objections to offer, but m the case of Turkey, finance and
politics are so mixed up that it is inevitable that in finding treaty terms acceptable
to Turkey and France political considerations must carry great weight.
I shall be prepared, if the situation arises, to make suggestions \vith regard to
other possible concessions, military, economic and judicial, which might renc ei our
proposals more palatable to the Kemalist Turks. But it would perhaps be
premature to dilate upon them now. ^ , T ,
My general conclusion, however, is that if something like the teims 1 ia\e
sketched could be agreed upon by the three Principal Allies and offered jointly and
firmly to the Greeks and Kemalists in the near future, a settlement should not be
found impossible. ^ r i •
As regards procedure, apart from M. Gounans proposal to come to London in
the middle of this month, a preliminary informal discussion with the Gieeks seems
essential, if only because we do not know their present attitude, and moio
especially because it seems absolutely necessary that His Majesty’s Government
should do their utmost to persuade them to take the line advocated above
regarding Smyrna. The present position of the Greeks in Asia Minor is, after all,
largely due to the mandate originally given them by the Supreme Council; and
His Majesty’s Government’s obligations towards Greece, however slight they may
be legally and on paper, render it desirable that we should treat their susceptibili
ties as far as possible with consideration, at any rate until we see whethei friendly
but strong persuasion fails to succeed. If the objection be raised that such a
discussion would make it appear that we intended to back the Gieeks stiongly in
the approaching conference, we could meet it by explaining to the Fiench m
advance what line we intend to take with the Greeks, and possibly by even
suggesting that they should take steps to sound Angora in the samp way as we
are sounding the Greeks as to their attitude towards the conference and terms of
peace. The French may be in a better position to do this than we.
The next step after discussion with the Greeks would appear to be to call an
Allied Conference and to try to obtain an Allied agreement as to the main terms to
be offered to both Greece and Turkey. The partial agreement reached at Paris in
June would form the natural basis for such a resumption of Allied discussion, but
the Allies should then be in a better position to know the Greek, and possibly the
Kemalist, attitude, and it seems essential to remove the deadlock regarding Thrace
which existed in June at Paris.