Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎140v] (280/348)

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present position of the Greek army during the interval? If he adopted that course,
and if the Constantinople reports as to the condition of the Greek army in I ira 5^
were true, was there a chance of his policy being carried out with success . it
very well be that, in a few months’ time, the moral of the Greek forces wou o
sufficiently restored to give them a reasonable chance, but could that be expected now .
Again, we pointed out to him that, at the present moment, the Kemalist forces were
massed in numbers alleged to approximate 40,000 to 50,000 behind the Ism id lines,
and, in the event of the Greeks refusing to accept the line to be laid cown in
Mudania, what was there to prevent Mustapha Kemal, already thirsting to get «i
Constantinople, from making their refusal an excuse for bursting into Europe, am
carrying fire and sword into Eastern Thrace ? In such a situation, what chance
could there be for the Greek forces? Might not M. Veniselos be jeopardising tie
very interests that he had in view in Western Thrace and elsewhere, and lendenng
it even more difficult to vindicate them in the face of a triumphant enemy .
As regards guarantees, I could of course not speak except from the P 01 *^ ^
view of my own Government. Certainly, if I were at the peace conference, I should
fight hard for Western Thrace and the other Greek interests to which M. veniselos
had referred.
As to this, he was somewhat contemptuous in replying, declaring that England
would be in a constant minority against France and Italy and that the Greek chance
of success would be small. r • i i
Both my colleague and I endeavoured to impress upon M. V eniselos the need
for some reflection before he embarked upon the line which he contemplated, and
which both of us thought would be fraught with great danger to his own interests.
His reply was an indignant complaint as to the way in which the Greeks had
been treated when they were not allowed to march upon Constantinople, and an
assertion that, in the circumstances predicated, the Greek army still in Thrace
would have no alternative but to advance upon Chatalja and to seize the Chatalja
lines : then, he said, holding the country from sea to sea, they would be able to resist
successfully for many months any attack that the whole of the Kemalist forces might
be able to make upon them.
When we indicated that such a course of action was, in the circumstances, quite
impracticable, and would not be tolerated by the Allies, M. \ eniselos swept aside
our arguments and declined to recede from his position.
It is very difficult in a short summary to give an account of a conversation that
lasted for an hour and a quarter, in the course of which M. Veniselos spoke with
a very pardonable emotion, and used at times language which it was not pleasant
He said that he was going over to see M. Poincare to-day, and would not make
up his mind until he had seen the French Premier. .
The meeting left me with the impression that M. \ eniselos was imperfectly
acquainted witlTthe real condition of the Greek forces upon which he is tempted
to rely; that he hardly realised the position in which the Greeks would be placed
if they resisted altogether the Allied decisions to be taken in Mudania ; and that he
had not given due weight to the fact that, pending the peace conference, the Allied
poliev was, not to surrender Thrace to the Kemalist army, but to set up some form
of interim’ administration and control which should maintain the peace until the
peace conference assembled. ^ 0F
Foreign Office, October 3, 1922.