Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎141r] (281/348)

OIRCULATED TO THE CABINET,
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s GovernmenM
EASTERN. [October 13.J
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
[E 11065/27/44] No. 1.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Eardinge (Paris).
(No. 3112.)
My Lord, Foreign Office, October 13, 1922.
THE French Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and asked on behalf of
his Government if His Majesty’s Government would agree to a proposal that the Allied
contingents which, under the Mudania Convention, are on the eve of starting for
Thrace should be placed under the single command of the French General Charpy.
He pointed out that that officer had had considerable experience of Thrace during and
since the war, and he thought that his appointment would be agreeable to everyone
concerned.
1 asked whether this appointment, if made, was in any way to derogate from the
authority of General Harington, who was the Allied Commander-in-chief in
Constantinople; and 1 said that I thought the command would more naturally have
devolved upon the latter officer.
The Comte de Saint-Aulaire, however, assured me that there was no idea of
impugning the authority of General Harington, and the suggestion was that
General Charpy should be in command of the various detachments in Thrace alone.
I had in my hands a telegram just received from General Harington, in which he
himself appeared to concur in the advisability of having a single commander, but
added that his colleagues had regarded it as inadvisable. There was, however, to be a
furiher meeting on the subject to-day, the result of which General Harington had
promised to telegraph to England. I thought, therefore, that I had better await this
communication before expressing a final opinion to the Ambassador.
His Excellency next referred to a communication his Government had received
from General Gouraud, pointing out that the British consul in Damascus had claimed
the right to protect certain Arabs of Nejd, who were in the Syrian capital. The
French Government wished to know whether we regarded Nejd as being within
the British sphere of influence, though it did not seem to be so regarded in the
arrangements that had been concluded with regard to the Near East.
1 replied at once that fbn Saud, the ruler of Nejd, was in treaty relations with us;
that he was one of the Arab chiefs who received an annual subsidy from Great Britain ;
and that accordingly the claim of the British consul in Damascus seemed to be entirely
justified.
The Ambassador then asked me what was the opinion of His Majesty’s Govern
ment with regard to the announcement just made by the Italian Government that they
regarded the agreement concerning the surrender of the Dodecanese, which they had
made with the Greek Government after the war, as null and void, their argument
apparently being that, as the Treaty of Sevres had fallen to the ground, this agreement,
which was connected with it, had collapsed also.
1 replied immediately that this was an attitude in which we could not possibly
acquiesce, and that I was engaged at the moment in drawing up a note in reply to
the communication of the Italian Ambassador, in which I should point out to him
that, in the view of His Majesty’s Government, which had frequently been expressed
before, all these arrangements were part of a single whole ; that the Italian Govern
ment could not escape from their obligation by repudiating it merely because Greece
was down ; and that we, at any rate, could lend no sort of support to such
a proceeding.
Finally, I acquainted his Excellency with the communications which had just
passed between M. Poincare and myself with regard to the impending Peace
Conference lor the affairs of the Near East. I told him that I had learnt with
surprise, both that M. Poincare was prepared to reconsider the suggestion of Smyrna
as the seat of the conference, although it had been ridiculed both by M. Poincare
himself in Paris and by Ins Excellency whenever 1 had mentioned the subject to him;
and also that, in the same communication in which the French Prime Minister insisted
upon an almost immediate meeting of the conference, he actually proposed to make his
final opinion on this point dependent upon the advice of M. Franklin-Bouillon, who
[128 n—1]