'PRINCIPAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO PERSIA CONNECTED WITH THE SUMMARY OF EVENTS AND MEASURES OF VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDDLESTON IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. JANUARY 1899 TO NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV-PART IV. PERSIA.' [‎15r] (34/136)

possession of a British protected subject, and the payment to him of certain
sums of money which he had given as presents to the Foreign Minister and
other high officials. The mines were at once transferred, hut the money has
never been paid. Again the Imperial Bank of Persia has by its concession the
exclusive right of issuing bank notes, yet bank notes have for years been issued
in large numbers by certain Persian associations, and though many represent
ations have been made on the subject, the practice continues unchecked. I
have just heard that several thousand notes have been printed in England, on
behalf of one of these associations, and that they are now on their way to
Bushire. I shall submit these cases separately for orders, and in the meantime
I do not ask for any general ruling or assurance on the part of Her Majesty’s
Government with regard to our future treatment of such matters, but I have
thought it desirable to bring the point to notice, in order that the attitude of
the Persian Government towards us may be clearly understood.
On the other hand, if the Persians are again anxious for a loan, and if
they can satisfy us that the money will be properly spent, and not e£ eaten ” by
the chief officials, I would secure them a loan on easy conditions, relying for
the payment of instalments, not on material guarantees of the usual type, such
as would satisfy the Stock Exchange, but on the great power we have of putting
pressure upon the Persian Government.
To insist upon material guarantees of the usual type is, I fear, to defeat our
object. In the despatch No. 135 from the Government of India of the 11th of
August 1898, the following passages occur:—
“ The recent arrangement whereby receivers of the Imperial Bank of Persia
were to encash all customs duties at Bushire and Kermanshah, and to have
also the right to see that the duties are duly levied, appears likely, if established
to prove an important step towards developing the natural resources of Persia,
and increasing British influence.”
“We have recently heard of the resignation of the Amin-ed-Dowleh, on
whom the title of Sadr-i-Azam was conferred as lately as last December, and
from whom and from his colleagues so much was apparently hoped for in the
direction of reforms. We are as yet without precise information as to the
significance or cause of the Sadr-i-Azam’s resignation.”
The fact is that the cause of the late Sadr-i-Azam’s resignation, or rather
removal, was precisely the arrangement for the control of the customs duties.
Unable to find any money for the daily expenses of the Shah and the conduct
of the administration, and feeling that his retention in power depended upon
his doing so, the unfortunate Sadr-i-Azam very reluctantly accepted the offer
of a small loan from the Imperial Bank, and put their receivers in charge of
the customs. The measure was intensely unpopular among the Persian
merchants, who had to pay their customs dues, and among the officials at head
quarters, who resented the interference of the Eeringi. The Sadr-i-Azam was
loudly denounced for having “sold Bushire to the English” , and in a few
weeks he was dismissed from office. He is now living in seclusion at Tehran,
never leaving his house, and his lifelong rival, the Amin-es-Sultan, who is
opposed to all reform and was strongly supported by the Russians, has been
appointed Sadr-i-Azam in his place. In my memorandum of 1895 I explained
the great difficulty of effecting any reforms, notably in the customs system, and
I added:—
“ By pressing for them inconsiderately, we run the risk, not only of failure,
but of making ourselves disliked- by the Shah and Sadr-i-Azam and other
influential persons, and of driving them into the arms of Russia.”
These words are just as true now as they were in 1895, and I would earn
estly recommend that we should act with great caution in these matters. If
we contemplate at any time helping the Persians to a loan, we should avoid
insisting upon the immediate control of the Customs Houses. A clause pro
viding that control will be given if the instalments on the loan are not paid,
is, I think, the utmost that we require. Tiie Customs Houses at Bushire,
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