'PRINCIPAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO PERSIA CONNECTED WITH THE SUMMARY OF EVENTS AND MEASURES OF VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDDLESTON IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. JANUARY 1899 TO NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV-PART IV. PERSIA.' [‎15v] (35/136)

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Linea h and Bunder ABbas, through which passes yearly otct three millions of
trade lie under the guns of our ships, and we could at any time put a boats
crew and a Bank Agent in possession of each, eren if we had no agreement at
ill In my opinion therefore we can guarantee a loan, and thus, let Persia
have money at very low interests, and put her under a real obligation without
any appreciable risk. I hope that this view of the case will be considered by
Her Maiesty’s Government, and that we shall, m the case of another loan being
contemplated, rely on our power rather than on material guarantees.
I doubt whether that power is fully recognised by ourselves. The Persians
have no doubt of it. They see that our frontier, that is the frontier of Kalat
and sea, not to speak of Afghanistan, marches with theirs for something like
fifteen hundred miles. They know very well that the Russians cannot help
them in the south and south-east: and that in the Gulf provinces such show of
authority as they still exercise depends upon our forbearance, if not upon our
support. Por example, the port of Lingah is now in possession of a revolted
Arab Sheikh, whom the Persians have recognised as Governor. They have no
power to coerce him, and begged me to send a.gumboat to do so. He would most
gladly hoist our flag to-morrow. On the Karun also the Arabs are in possession,
and ready at a word from us to throw off the semblance of Persian supremacy.
The Gulf ports— Mohammerah, Bushire, Lingah, Bunder Abbas—are at the
mercy of our ships. So great is the respect of the Persians for our power that
even in the extreme north of our zone, among the fanatical townbred population
of Ispahan, any demonstration on our part has immediate effect. Two or three
years ago there was trouble in Ispahan, and the Mullas were stirring up mischief
againsAhe Europeans. It happened that at this mom,ent a British squadron was
sent into Turkish waters, and news of the movement was brought to Persia by
the public telegrams. The Missionary Bishop at Ispahan wrote to inform me that
the hostile demonstrations against the Europeans had ceased at once, and that
the attitude of the Mullas had completely changed. He said that the change
was caused by the news about our fleet, which was apparently interpreted as
an indication that the English were getting angry. Almost equal sensitiveness
was shown last year when the news of the battle of Omdurman became known.
It spread like wildfire all over the country, and was the common subject of
conversation not only at the capital, but in remote villages of Persian-Baluch
istan, where the markedly respectful attitude of the people attracted the notice
of our officers. I mention these facts to show that we are greatly feared in
Persia, and that consequently we can with ease make our wishes respected.
The reason why the Persians often disregard them is what I have mentioned
before, that they think our forbearance is practically unlimited. But whenever
they see that we are in earnest, and that Her Majesty’s Government is interested
in a case, the Shah and his Ministers speedily become convinced of the necessity
for meeting our wishes. I would ask Her Majesty’s Government to believe that •
we have still great power and reputation in Persia.
Having such power we can afford both to be decided in insisting upon our
legitimate interests, and to be sympathetic and easy in our terms if the Persians
ask us for help, pecuniary or other.
We can also do something to check Russian encroachments. In my
memorandum of 1895 I suggested our letting it be understood that aggressive
action by Russia in the north of Persia would immediately result in decided
action by us in the south. I still think that this is our proper policy. I do
not mean that we should bully or unduly threaten the Persian Government,
but I would let them understand that w T e cannot regard without concern any
such action as, for example, the pushing down of the Russian sanitary wedge
towards Seistan, and that we shall, if these things happen, ask for conpensations
which the Persian Government may dislike. It is easy to do this, and it may
help the Persian Government to resist demands which otherwise they would
find it difficult to avoid accepting. I think they should realise that any
serious concession made in the north is likely to involve an equivalent concession
in the south. Hitherto they have realised only the converse of the proposition.