'PRINCIPAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO PERSIA CONNECTED WITH THE SUMMARY OF EVENTS AND MEASURES OF VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDDLESTON IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. JANUARY 1899 TO NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV-PART IV. PERSIA.' [‎16r] (36/136)

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I fully recognise that it may be embarrassing for us to commit ourselves before
hand to any particular method of action, but the principle should be under
stood. If Her Majesty’s Government do not give me orders to the contrary,
this is the line I propose to take in the future.
Similarly, to turn to another clause of my recommendations of 1895, if
Her Majesty’s Government do not give me orders to the contrary, I propose in
the event of the Shah’s death to recognise provisionally the succession of the
Valiahd as I did three years ago.
I may now perhaps usefully recapitulate what I have written regarding
the state of Persia in 1899, and the steps which should be taken to improve our
position in the country.
The internal condition of Persia is exceedingly bad, worse in some respects
than in 1895. The finances are in greater disorder, the troops and civil establish
ments are unpaid, food is dear, the Shah is a weak ruler who maintains no
discipline, and his Prime Minister has no powers, so that there is practically no
Government. The Russians have shown considerable activity in the northern
provinces, pushing on roads, and energetically encouraging their trade, and
making use of their missionaries among the Christian populations. They have
put “ sanitary” posts along the Afghan border, and have tried to establish
their trade and influence in Seistan. They have also established a Consulate
at Ispahan.
Nevertheless the internal condition of Persia is by no meens hopeless, her
debt being practically nothing, and her resources considerable. And although
Rusia has been active in some respects, we still hold a strong position. Our trade
and our influence are completely dominant up to the Khanikin-Seistan line; and
though our trade has suffered in the north, it is still alive. Our bank does
business all over Persia, and is the only bank that can legally issue notes. Our
Telegraph Department controls a large part of the Persian telegraph system.
Our political influence is still great, even in the north, and our power is much
feared. Still it cannot be denied that our position is threatened.
To maintain and improve it we should increase by five or six the number
of our English Consular officers, and should encourage them all to travel and
know their districts. We should also improve the condition of our Consulates
at Tabriz and. Ispahan. We should try to open out new trade routes, and to
make those which exist a little better than they are. Possibly we might prospect
for a railway. We should also make more use of our Telegraph Department,
trying to get into our hands as much of the Persian telegraph system as
possible, and to have all our Consular posts in effective communication with
Tehran. We should insist upon our interests being specially considered
within our zone, that is up to the Khanikin-Seistan line. Amongst other
things we should exercise some unofficial control over the appointment and
dismissal of the Persian Governors. We should be strict in keeping tbe
Persians to their engagements and resisting injustice; but, on the other hand,
having the power to coerce Persia very easily, we should be considerate in our
dealings with her if she wants help, and, under certain circumstances, we should
guarantee a loan for her, refraining at the same time from taking material
guarantees of an unpalatable description, or forcing upon her reforms for
which she is not prepared. We should decide now to recognise the Shah’s
eldest son if the Shah dies. Einally, we should let it be clearly understood that
encroachment by Russia in the north will entail concessions to us in the south.
In conclusion, I think it will be as well to notice two objections which may
be brought against these proposals. The first is that, if we already have in
Persia a larger Consular staff than the Russians, as the sketch map shows, there
seems to be no necessity for our increasing it. There is force in this objection,
but the fact remains that the Russians are pushing our trade out of Northern
Persia, and that they have begun to touch the northern fringe of our zone.