'PRINCIPAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO PERSIA CONNECTED WITH THE SUMMARY OF EVENTS AND MEASURES OF VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDDLESTON IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. JANUARY 1899 TO NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV-PART IV. PERSIA.' [‎58v] (121/136)

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and with a view, by discussion, to re-establish the equilibrium which by her
initial action she would have violently disturbed. We should enter as the
supporters of the dynasty, in order to ensure a return to the status quo ante,
and to save those parts of the country lyin? nearest to our borders or m which
our interests are paramount, from the risks of disorder that could haidly fail
t 0 be aroused by the news of an undisputed occupation by a foreign Power,
and that would equally affect the security of Persian interests and our own.
Above all, though this may sound paradoxical, ve should^ entei in cider to
accelerate, under proper conditions, evacuation by the itussians as well as our
selves. The places at which such actions are open to us are, broadly speaking,
four in number,—namely, Seistan, Bunder Abbas, Bushire, and Mohammerah.
Of these an advance upon Seistan, or the occupation oi Bundei Abbas and
the adjacent islands, or the two in combination, would undoubtedly pioduce tiie
greatest impression upon Russia, since if persisted in they would cut right
across the lines of her Asiatic policy and would imperil the attainment of her
ultimate ends. The occupation of Mohammerah would probably _ produce a
greater moral effect upon the Persians from its gieatei proximity to the
capital, more especially if it were accompanied or followed by the threat of a
movement upon Isfahan. On the whole, as it would be more important at such
a juncture to influence Russia than to frighten Persia, we should recommend
the first in preference to the second plan of action. If Russia were to advance
upon Tabriz or Meshed (or a fortiori upon Tehran), we would at once push
forward a force to Seistan, and we would move the fleet to Bunder Abhas.
The occupation of that port and of the adjacent islands is merely a question
of running up a flag, which would be eagerly welcomed by the inhabitants,
who are not Persians, but Arabs. The general principle to be observed,
according to our view, would be that for every movement made by Russia
a corresponding movement should be made by ourselves, but that each
movement should be accompanied by an invitation to open a discussion with a
view to the resumption of the status quo. We may interpolate the remark
at this stage that should an advance be ordered under the conditions above
predicated into Seistan, we do not think that the entire cost should be borne
upon the Indian revenues. The expedition would be undertaken in defence of
imperial interests, and not exclusively or mainly for the protection of India,
which would hardly be endangered, for instance, by a Russian occupation
of Tabriz.
10. We will suppose that one or other of the steps above enumerated has
been taken by the Russians and followed by ourselves. The question then arises—
What will be the probable consequence of our action ? We desire to impress upon
His Majesty’s Government the enormous value of the leverage that we should
thus be able to exercise upon the Russian Government. It will, we imagine,
be generally conceded that the ulterior objects of Russian policy in Persia are
three in number, viz. (1) to reach the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , (2) to acquire such control
over the Government and the interior of Persia (partly by pressure at Tehran,
partly by railways and Russian troops) as to convert Persia into an exclusively
Russian market, and (B) by means of (1) to be in a position to apply pressure
to yet one more vulnerable spot on the flank of Great Britain. The occupa
tion by British forces of Seistan and of the mouth of the Gulf would be a
serious, if not an insuperable, barrier to the realisation of these ambitions, and we
entertain little doubt that, if persisted in, they would before long bring home to
the Russian Government the advantages of an early discussion and settlement
with ourselves. It is unnecessary at this stage to examine the terms that might
then be agreed upon. The entire situation is hypothetical, and we are not con
cerned with more than the preliminary stages in a probable course of evolution.
11. There is, however, one aspect of the case upon which we lay the greatest
stress. The surest, indeed the only, preventive of such action on the part of
Russia as we have here discussed is that she should know in advance what
will be the consequences of her action. If she is fully convinced that a move
upon Tabriz or Meshed will be at once followed by a British move in the south,
and particularly upon the Gulf Ports, she will probably think twice about a step
that would risk so much for so problematical a gain. We understand that
under instructions from the Marquess of Lansdowne, Sir A. Hardinge has